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Despite the crucial importance of Hamilton’s (1964) kin selection theory in 
evolutionary behavioral biology, psychological studies of family relationships have 
been relatively slow to incorporate a Darwinian perspective. One practical reason may 
be that existing evolutionary models of animal families, such as the honest signaling 
models, are applicable only if all family members fall into the same class in terms of 
age, sex, or health. The animal models are thus of limited use for investigating human 
families, in which the relative age of the child, as a corollary of birth order, may have 
played a pivotal role in shaping evolved family psychology. My dissertation has two 
main objectives: 1) to construct evolutionary mathematical models of family 
interactions that fully take into account the role of reproductive value and hence can be 
directly applied to human families; 2) to characterize the design features of evolved 
psychological mechanisms of human kinship by empirically testing a priori predictions 
derived from the models. I first examine how parents are expected to allocate their 
limited resources among offspring of differing ages. I show that the optimal strategy 
that serves parental interests is to bias parental resources toward the older offspring 
(chapter 2). I then empirically test the predictions derived from the first study, in 
comparison with previous evolutionary hypotheses of parental favoritism. The empirical 
results confirmed the predictions derived from the first study: in hypothetical allocation 
 viii
tasks, participants allocated more tangible resources toward older children (chapter 3). 
Next, I investigate how intrafamilial conflict over the allocation of parental resources 
occur when each family member (a parent, its senior offspring, and its junior offspring) 
are allowed to differ in age. The results gained in this study may require a substantial 
revision of Trivers’ (1974) classical theory of parent-offspring conflict. Moreover, it 
will open a fruitful avenue for inferring the adaptive design of psychological 
mechanisms dealing with sibling relationships (chapter 4). I then show that evolutionary 
insights can be also applied to the psychological study of distant kin relationships such 
as cousins (chapter 5).   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
As the idiom “blood is thicker than water” implies, people generally agree that 
family relationships are more important than any other relationships. Family 
relationships, however, have been largely ignored by personality and social psychology. 
The textbooks of social psychology are overwhelmingly devoted to studies of stranger 
interactions. Even the subfield concerned with close relationships mainly focuses on 
mates and friends, not on blood kin (Daly, Salmon, & Wilson, 1997). Of course, the 
temporal development of kin relationships over the life-span has been actively 
investigated by developmental psychology. Yet the field fails to answer how various 
relationships among family members could be parsimoniously analyzed under a unified 
theoretical framework, let alone how they should develop over time (Buss, 2004).  
By contrast, kin interactions have been the central focus of evolutionary 
biologists since Hamilton’s (1964) theory of inclusive fitness. Behavioral ecological 
study of animal sociality has now achieved a great success in providing powerful 
theoretical models and garnering plentiful empirical support. This dissertation is based 
on the conviction that modern evolutionary insights into social cooperation and conflict 
will revolutionize psychological research on human family systems. The contention is 
not new, being articulated more than 30 years ago (Alexander, 1979; Hamilton, 1975; 
Trivers, 1974; Williams, 1966; Wilson, 1975). Despite recent advances of evolutionary 
social psychology and evolutionary developmental psychology (Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 
2002; Simpson & Kenrick, 1997), however, the evolutionary perspective has thus far 
inspired relatively little research on human kinship psychology (e.g., in contrast to 
human mating). I suggest that it is primarily because current intrafamilial interaction 
models in evolutionary biology have been based on a somewhat simplistic assumption 
that all offspring are identical in their ability to survive and reproduce. The assumption 
is reasonable when all offspring can be treated equally in some important respects (e.g., 
 2
synchronously hatching birds where all offspring are of the same age). However, in 
many species including humans, the assumption is rarely justified, which makes it 
difficult for human psychologists to derive clear and testable predictions from 
evolutionary models. 
My dissertation aims 1) to construct an evolutionary mathematical model of the 
family that can be directly applied to human family systems and 2) to characterize the 
design features of evolved psychological mechanisms of human kinship by empirically 
testing a priori predictions derived from the model. Specifically, I examine how 
intrafamilial conflict and cooperation are delineated within the human family, in which 
the genetic interests of parent(s), senior siblings, and junior siblings must diverge. 
Below I first briefly review the general theory of social evolution with an emphasis on 
intrafamilial conflict. I then discuss why it is necessary to construct an evolutionary 
model of the human family.  
 
EVOLUTION OF SOCIALITY WITHIN THE FAMILY  
Classification of social behavior 
The theory of social evolution classifies social behaviors in terms of their effects 
on the reproductive success of the actor and on any recipient(s) (Hamilton, 1964; see 
Figure 1.1). First, selfish behaviors increase the fitness of the actor but decrease the 
fitness of the recipient. Second, cooperative behaviors increase both the fitness of the 
actor and the recipient. Third, altruistic behaviors decrease the fitness of the actor but 
increase that of the recipient. Lastly, spiteful behaviors decrease both. It should be noted 
that these four categories refer to the fitness effects of social traits, not to psychological 
states. According to Darwin’s classical theory, altruistic and spiteful traits should not be 
favored by natural selection because they decrease the fitness of the individual bearing 
the traits and thus will fail to be passed on to the next generation. Altruistic behaviors, 
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Figure 1.1 Hamilton’s (1964) fourfold classification of social traits. 
 
Hamilton’s rule 
It was Hamilton (1964) who solved the vexing problem. He emphasized that 
statistical associations between individuals will influence the course of natural selection. 
If an individual bearing genes encoding altruistic behavior is positively associated with 
other individuals carrying the same genes (e.g., through a common genealogy), then the 
altruistic individual will receive more altruistic acts from its social partners. Thus the 
fitness of an individual is affected not only by its own phenotype but also by the 
phenotype of its neighbors. This is called direct or neighbor-modulated fitness, which 
accounts for social behavior from the viewpoint of the recipients of social acts (Frank, 
1998; Hamilton, 1970). Alternatively, we can think that an altruistic individual may 
increase the transmission of the genes for altruism that reside in its recipients’ bodies, as 
long as there are positive associations between the actor and its recipients. Thus the 
fitness of an individual is affected not only by its own phenotype but also by its effect 
on its neighbor’s fitness. This is called inclusive fitness, which accounts for social 
behavior from the viewpoint of the actor itself (Hamilton, 1964). 
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The two ways of analyzing interactions between individuals reach a 
mathematically equivalent conclusion, i.e., Hamilton’s rule. The rule states that a social 
trait will be favored by selection if rB > C, where B is the fitness benefit to the recipient, 
C is the fitness cost to the actor, and r is the regression coefficient of relatedness 
between individuals. Since common genealogy is the most common source for 
generating statistical associations between individuals, Hamilton’s theory of social 
evolution is often called kin selection theory (Maynard Smith, 1982). Yet it is worth 
noting that the regression coefficient of relatedness is more general than genealogical 
relatedness (Frank, 1998; Hamilton, 1964, 1970). Hamilton’s rule specifies the 
condition for the increase of a gene for helping genetic relatives at a cost to the actor 
itself; thus it represent a unified theory for family relationships (Mock & Parker, 1997). 
 
Conflicts within the family 
Trivers (1974) contended that families are not necessarily harmonious and 
peaceful enclaves, which would exhibit internal conflict only when they become 
somehow “dysfunctional.” Rather, the family should be regarded as a social unit rife 
with evolutionary conflicts of interests between all family members over the flow of 
parental investment (PI) from parent(s) to offspring. Although family members have 
partly overlapping interests, they are not genetically identical and hence conflicts of 
interests are predicted to ensue. 
There could be three major forms of evolutionary conflict within the family (Mock 
& Parker, 1997; see Figure 1.2). First, parental conflict may occur concerning how 
much PI each parent should give to their offspring within the family. Either parent will 
benefit if its partner provides more PI. Second, parent-offspring conflict may occur 
concerning how much PI the parent(s) should provide to their offspring. Offspring are 
designed to ‘want’ more PI than the parent is designed to give. Third, sibling conflict 
may occur concerning the amount of PI that each sibling should obtain. Siblings within 
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a family compete with each other to gain more resources. The actual level of PI as 
observed in nature should be the simultaneous resolution of all three evolutionary 
games between family members.  
 
Female parent Male parent
Parental conflict




Figure 1.2. Three major forms of conflicts within families.  
 
Parent-offspring conflict 
Trivers’ (1974) theory of parent-offspring conflict applies Hamilton’s rule to 
analyze parent-offspring interactions. An offspring is related to itself (r = 1.0) two times 
greater than its siblings (r = 0.5 if full siblings); hence it will value itself higher than its 
sibling. A female parent, however, is equally related to all of her offspring (r = 0.5) (the 
same is true for a male parent if he fertilized all offspring). All else being equal, i.e., if 
there were no differences in each offspring’s states like age, sex, or physiological 
condition, a mother is expected to equally invest into all offspring. Therefore, selection 
acts on genes expressed in parents and young in different ways such that an offspring 
insists more resources than the parent is willing to give.  
A concrete example may help understand the potential genetic conflict between 
parent and offspring (see Figure 1.3). Consider a parent looking after her single 
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offspring. Offspring fitness is assumed to an increasing function f(x) of the amount of 
PI, x, that it receives from the parent, with diminishing returns. The parent suffers a 
linear cost in terms of her future reproductive success, which is given by g(x) = G + bx 
(G is a positive constant and b (< 0) measures the marginal cost of parental care). The 
parent’s inclusive fitness is now written as Wp= f(x) + g(x). Maximizing Wp with regard 
to x gives the parent’s evolutionarily stable (ESS) amount of PI:  








,              (1.1) 
where the prime denotes differentiation with respect to x. The ESS amount of PI from 
the parent’s point of view lies in the point *px  at which the marginal benefit from 
additional resources (f'(x)) is equal to the marginal cost of investing into the current 
offspring, with opposite sign (− b). Graphically, it is when a line with a positive slope 
(− b) is tangent to the offspring fitness curve f(x). By contrast, the offspring’s inclusive 
fitness is written as Wo = f(x) + (½)g(x), where we assume full siblings for convenience. 
Maximizing Wo gives the offspring’s evolutionarily stable (ESS) amount of PI:  








.           (1.2) 
The ESS amount of PI from the offspring’s point of view lies in the point *ox  at which 
a line with a less steep slope (− ½b) is tangent to the offspring fitness curve f(x). Figure 
1.3 shows that the optimal PI from the offspring’s point of view, *ox , is necessarily 
greater than the optimal PI from the parent’s point of view, *px . Up to
*
px , both 
participants agree to increase PI. However, between *px  and 
*
ox  there exists a range of 
PI over which the best parental strategy is to decrease PI, but the best offspring strategy 
is to increase PI. The zone of parent-offspring conflict indicates the presence of 
potential genetic ‘battleground’ over the amount of PI between parent and offspring. 
Beyond *ox , both participants agree to decrease PI (Godfray, 1995, 1999; Mock & 
















slope = − b
slope = − ½b
 
Figure 1.3. A graphical illustration of the battleground of parent-offspring conflict. 
 
Scramble competition models vs. honest signaling models 
Theoretical models of family relationships have often employed vigorous begging 
displays of nestling birds as a model system to predict the ESS allocation of parental 
resources among offspring (Mock & Parker, 1997; Wright & Leonard, 2002). Begging 
was initially interpreted as the outcome of scramble competition among nestlings under 
offspring’s control over resource allocation (Macnair & Parker, 1979; Parker & 
Macnair, 1979). Recent models of honest-signaling suggest that begging displays 
honestly advertise offspring’s cryptic condition (e.g., hungry level) to parents who 
control resource allocation (Godfray, 1991, 1995a).  
 
REPRODUCTIVE VALUE AND THE HUMAN FAMILY 
Despite a number of mathematically sophisticated models of intrafamilial 
conflict, behavioral ecologists often complain that current theoretical models are too 
unrealistic to forcefully guide their empirical research in the laboratory and the field 
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(Mock & Parker, 1997; D. Mock, 2005, personal communication). No wonder 
evolutionary psychologists concerned with human families acknowledge that “the 
available models offer psychologists only broad guidelines [italics added] about 
cooperative and competitive behavior among kin” (Kurland & Gaulin, 2005, p. 456).  
One serious limitation of current evolutionary models of intrafamilial interactions 
is that all individuals in the population are assumed to be of the same class. That is, it is 
assumed that individuals following a certain strategy are all identical in their probability 
of survival and reproductive output. The assumption makes it possible to characterize 
the fitness of a strategy simply as the total number of offspring produced over the 
lifetime of an individual following the strategy. However, in many (perhaps most) 
cases, individuals can be more than one class. They may differ, for example, in age, sex, 
size, developmental stage, or physiological condition (e.g., fat stores), which is fairly 
obvious to both field behavioral ecologists and human psychologists. Since offspring 
following a given strategy may differ in their state and hence in their ability to produce 
offspring in the next generation, we can no longer evaluate the fitness of a strategy 
simply by counting offspring (Charlesworth, 1994; Houston & McNamara, 1999; 
Taylor, 1990). Then, how could we evaluate the fitness of PI allocation strategy among 
offspring of more than one class? 
Fisher’s (1930) concept of reproductive value provides the solution. Reproductive 
value measures the relative contributions of individuals of different classes to the 
ancestry of future generations; thus it functions as a weighting factor for the effect of a 
strategy on offspring belonging to different classes. Recently, a formal method that 
applies the concept of reproductive value to determine the evolutionarily stable strategy 
(ESS) in a class-structured population has been established (a strategy is said to be ESS 
if it is adopted by all members of the population then no other strategy could replace it) 
(Frank, 1998; Pen & Weissing, 2002; Taylor, 1990; Taylor & Frank, 1996a). The 
reproductive value approach weights the costs and benefits of both the actor (parents) 
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and the recipients (offspring) with class-specific reproductive value, thus finding out a 
proper fitness measure for a certain PI allocation strategy. The proper fitness measure is 
often called ‘invasion fitness’, one that is given by the asymptotic population growth 
rate of a mutant subpopulation relative to the growth rate of the resident population 
(Metz, Nisbet, & Geritz, 1992). If a population is ESS with respect to parents’ resource 
allocation strategy among different-aged offspring, any invading mutant strategy should 
have a lower rate of asymptotic growth than the resident strategy. The asymptotic 
growth rate of the mutant must thus be at a local maximum when it adopts the optimal 
allocation strategy. 
In this dissertation, I explicitly make use of reproductive value approach to 
construct an evolutionary model of family interactions. Given that age difference 
commonly results in divergent reproductive value among individuals, such an 
evolutionary model is applicable to a wide variety of organisms that are structured into 
distinct age classes. The approach is especially valuable for analyzing human family 
systems, where children within a household are of different ages and have a very long 
developmental period, relative to other comparably sized primates (Bogin, 1997; Geary 
& Flinn, 2001).  
In humans, the period of offspring dependency extends well past the typical age of 
weaning (usually between ages 3 and 4 years in traditional societies) into the childhood 
period. Throughout the period of offspring dependency, offspring survival critically 
depends on parental caregiving (Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 2002). Humans’ prolonged 
immaturity is hence considered “a hallmark of our species and is responsible, in large 
part, for many of our cognitive and behavioral features” (Bjorklund & Yunger, 2001, p. 
64). Consequently, constructing an ESS model for the family systems that are structured 
into age classes will provide valuable insights into the adaptive design features of 
human psychological mechanisms governing parental and child psychology over the 




In chapter 2, I show how a class-structured ESS model based on age-specific 
reproductive value could be constructed for analyzing the flow of parental resources 
from parent(s) to offspring of different age classes. In chapter 3, I attempt to test a 
priori predictions about human parental favoritism among different-aged children by 
asking human participants. In chapter 4, I theoretically investigate the genetic 
‘battleground’ in which the evolutionary interests of each family member (a parent, 
older offspring, and younger offspring) collide with each other in a subtle but crucial 
way. In chapter 5, I study the differential altruistic tendency toward cousins, 
demonstrating that Hamilton’s insight is also valuable for elucidating our evolved 
psychology toward distant kin. In the final chapter, I review the major results of the 
dissertation and suggest directions for future research. 
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Chapter 2: Parental Favoritism among Different-aged Offspring 
SUMMARY  
The theories of intrafamilial conflict and parental investment have yet to 
examine how parental decision to allocate its resources is influenced by the fact that its 
offspring may not be identical, but classified into distinct age classes. Two 
counteracting effects of offspring growth on parental allocation of resources have 
deterred the development of a formal model: a parent may favor its older offspring due 
to their greater reproductive value and yet favor its younger offspring due to their higher 
marginal returns from extra resources. Using evolutionary invasion analysis in class-
structured populations, I present a formal model that explores how a parent should 
allocate its resources among different-aged offspring from the viewpoint of parents. The 
parent’s evolutionarily stable strategy is to allocate its resources such that the marginal 
benefit to each offspring’s survival, devalued by the survival probability to the 
reproductive age, is equal to the marginal cost to the parent’s residual survival. Two 
general situations are considered in which younger offspring obtain higher marginal 
returns than older offspring. In nearly all circumstances, parents are expected to bias its 
resources toward older offspring. The result may well account for a widespread yet 
puzzling phenomenon in view of previous theories of intrafamilial conflict. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
Parents are expected to adaptively allocate their limited resources among 
offspring so as to maximize parental fitness (Clutton-Brock, 1991; Smith & Fretwell, 
1974; Winker, 1987). Yet offspring may be selected to demand more resources than 
parents are selected to provide (Trivers, 1974), which leads to various conflicts between 
family members over the flow of parental investment. Vigorous begging displays of 
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nestling birds are often employed as a model system to predict the evolutionarily stable 
(ES) level of parental investment among offspring (Mock & Parker, 1997). Begging 
was initially interpreted as the outcome of scramble competition among nestlings under 
offspring’s control over resource allocation (Macnair & Parker, 1979; Parker & 
Macnair, 1979). The alternative model suggests that begging displays honestly advertise 
offspring’s cryptic condition (defined as offspring’s marginal fitness gain from 
obtaining extra resources) to parents who control resource allocation within broods 
(Godfray, 1991, 1995b). The honest-signaling model predicts that parents should invest 
more in needier offspring, which are supported by a number of empirical evidence that 
hungrier nestlings indeed beg more and receive more food from their parents (Kilner & 
Johnstone, 1997). 
Within-brood resource allocation, however, must be shaped not only by 
offspring’s cryptic internal condition (commonly called as ‘need’) but by offspring’s 
external condition that parents may directly access, such as offspring’s age, sex, and 
competitive ability (Glassey & Forbes, 2002). In particular, age differences among 
offspring are very common in asynchronously hatching birds and many mammals. 
Hatching asynchrony in altricial birds greatly influences food allocation among 
nestlings with earlier-hatched (older) nestlings getting more food, leading to the higher 
mortality of later-hatched (younger) nestlings (Magrath, 1990). These findings have 
been interpreted as the consequence of scramble competition among nestlings where 
parents exert little or no control over resource distribution (Macnair & Parker, 1979; 
Parker & Macnair, 1979). Yet, parents may have full or much control over food 
distribution and preferentially invest into older offspring. Even when parents seem to 
passively feed more competitive offspring, it may be in parental interests to do so. 
Therefore, to understand how both cryptic and noncryptic conditions of offspring affect 
intrafamily social dynamics, it is necessary to elucidate the optimal distribution of 
resources among different-aged offspring from the viewpoint of parents.  
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 Unfortunately, no formal treatments have been made about how parents should 
allocate resources among their different-aged offspring (Clutton-Brock, 1991). Making 
realistic predictions about the issue has been considered very difficult, due to the 
mutually counteracting effects of offspring growth on the ES level of parental 
provisioning. On one hand, parents may favor older offspring because older offspring 
have higher reproductive value, i.e., greater genetic contribution far into the future 
generation (Fisher, 1930). This is both because older offspring are closer to 
reproductive maturity and because the instantaneous rate of juvenile mortality tends to 
decrease with increasing age. On the other hand, parents may favor younger offspring 
because younger offspring have higher needs for food than older offspring: the effect of 
additional investment on offspring survival will be higher for younger offspring 
(Clutton-Brock, 1991; Rubenstein, 1982; Sargent & Gross, 1986).  
Recent empirical studies of food allocation in asynchronously hatched broods 
pose a serious problem for extant models of parent-offspring interactions (Cotton, 
Wright, & Kacelnik, 1999; Lotem, 1998; Smiseth, Bu, Erikenaes, & Amundsen, 2003). 
According to the honest-signaling model’s definition of need, younger (smaller) 
nestlings are in greater need for food; hence they are expected to beg more vigorously 
and to be fed more often than older (larger) nestlings. Surprisingly, many experimental 
studies have found that older nestlings actually receive more food, even though they beg 
less intensively than their younger siblings (Kilner, 1995; Lotem, 1998; Price, Harvey, 
& Ydenberg, 1996; Smiseth et al., 2003). This striking discrepancy between theoretical 
predictions and empirical findings may indicate that fundamental aspects of parent-
offspring interaction have yet to be understood (Cotton et al., 1999). Meanwhile, the 
scramble competition model predicts that the older offspring with high competitive 
ability would get more food than the younger offspring, which coincides with most 
observed allocation patterns in asynchronously hatched broods (Mock & Parker, 1997; 
Parker, Royle, & Hartley, 2002a). However, age discrepancy cannot be simply equated 
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to competitive asymmetries among offspring. Offspring of the same age may still show 
considerably different competitive abilities because they may differ in, say, general 
health. Also, the age differences among offspring bring about a number of physiological 
and developmental changes, not all of which are translated into competitive 
asymmetries (Glassey & Forbes, 2002). It is thus unclear if the observed biased 
distribution of foods toward older offspring could be solely attributable to the 
competitive asymmetries per se. Moreover, as shown above, there remains the 
unresolved possibility that parents may have much or full control over food distribution 
and actively prefer feeding their older offspring. Indeed, recent empirical evidence 
indicates that parents may play an active role in food allocation within asynchronous 
broods (Kilner, 1995; Krebs, Cunningham, & Donnelly, 1999; Smiseth et al., 2003).  
To accurately assess the consequences of parental allocation of resources among 
offspring of different ages, it is necessary to construct evolutionary models of class-
structured populations in which individuals fall into different age classes. In such 
models, Fisher’s (1930) concept of reproductive value acts as a weighting factor for 
comparing the effects of changes in age-specific survival or fecundity on a common 
scale (Charlesworth, 1994; Frank, 1998; Pen & Weissing, 2002; Taylor, 1990; Taylor & 
Frank, 1996b). Here, I present a model that investigates how a parent should invest into 
its offspring who are classified into different age classes. Within the model’s life-history 
framework based on reproductive value, the effect of additional food on younger 
offspring’s survival will be allowed to be higher than older offspring’s survival. The 
model presented here thus integrates the two counteracting effects of offspring growth 




Dynamics of resident population 
Consider a diploid resident population that is structured into parents (class P) and 
their offspring classified into n age classes (class Oi: i = 1,…, n). For simplicity, I 
assume hermaphroditic individuals that reproduce as both male and female. After 
mating with another adult, a single parent produces 2f offspring per time step and 
allocates its limited resources among all offspring of differing ages. Since one-half of 
the 2f newborn offspring are credited to its mate, the parent actually expects fitness 
credit for f offspring. The population is further structured into distinct broods, in which 
each parent provisions only their own offspring within the brood. The length of the time 
step in this system corresponds to the average age gap between siblings; it will be 
measured in days for asynchronously hatching birds whereas it will typically be 
measured at a larger time scale for mammals (The model thus focuses on within-year 
dynamics for the case of asynchronously hatching birds). Given that offspring 
provisioning usually occurs over a considerable period of time, it would be desirable to 
consider the dynamic (i.e., time-dependent) aspects of parent-offspring interactions as 
well. Unfortunately, such an analysis is extremely difficult to be carried out. Following 
other authors (e.g., Godfray, 1995a, 1995b; Johnstone, 2004; Parker, Mock, & Lamey, 
1989; Rodriguez-Girones, Cotton, & Kacelnik, 1996), I assume that, for each time step, 
the parent-offspring interaction is composed of a series of feeding events and that the 
outcome of each event has an independent effect on the fitness of allocation strategy.  
At each feeding event during a time step, a focal parent invests in its current 
brood composed of different-aged offspring, at a cost of the parent’s future survival. 
The average number of age-i offspring per adult in the population is denoted as ui. The 
per capita amount of resources that an age-i offspring receives is xi. Thus the total 
amount of resources an average parent provisions for its current brood per each time 
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. An average parent’s allocation strategy is denoted 
by a vector x = [x1, x2,…, xn], where each trait value xi can be estimated by its genotypic 
value plus the unexplained residual. It is assumed that the n trait values are genetically 
uncorrelated with each other. An age-i offspring survives and grows into an offspring 
aged i +1 to the next time step with survival probability φi = φi(xi), which is assumed to 
be an increasing function of xi. A focal parent survives to the next time step with 
probability ψ = ψ(Ex), a decreasing function of Ex. Figure 2.1 depicts the life cycle for 




































.               (2.1) 
The resident population characterized by the matrix A will eventually reach a 
constant rate of geometric growth: A*u* = λu*, where λ is the dominant eigenvalue of 
the resident matrix A* at equilibrium and the column vector of stable age distribution 
u* = ][ 21
∗∗∗∗
pn u,u,...,u,u  is the dominant right eigenvector of A*. Since u* is determined 
up to a constant, I let the number of parental class ∗pu  equal 1.0 so that 
∗
iu  could 
represent the average number of age-i offspring per adult in the population at 
equilibrium. The row vector of individual reproductive values v* = ][ 21
∗∗∗∗
pn v,v,...,v,v  is 
the dominant left eigenvector of A*: v*A* = λv*. The two vectors u* and v* are 
obtained in Supplemental data 2.1.  
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Figure 2.1. A life cycle graph for an age-classified population with a parental class and 
n different-aged offspring classes. The arcs indicate transitions between 
age classes; the symbols labeling each arc indicate the contribution of each 
age class to another.  
 
It is unrealistic, however, to expect that the resident population will grow 
indefinitely: density-dependent factors will ensure that the population size is no longer 
changing. The constraint λ = 1 requires the following equation to be satisfied:  
                 )(1)()()( 2211








. Equation 2.2 means that, by the operation of density dependence, 
the rate at which new reproducing adults are introduced into the population (the left-
hand side) is balanced by the death rate of existing adults (the right-hand side). The 
assumption of density dependence implies that we need to decide which vital rate(s) in 
the life cycle will be influenced by the population density (Mylius & Diekmann, 1995; 
Pen & Weissing, 2000, 2002). Since density-dependent factors tend to act on offspring 
survival, particularly for bird populations (Charnov, 1993; Ricklefs, 2000), I assume 
that the age-1 offspring survival (φ1 (x1)) can be expressed in terms of other vital rates 
such that equation 2.2 is satisfied (in this system, it does not make any difference if we 
choose other vital rates to be density dependent).  
Given that it takes n time steps for a newborn offspring to become an adult, one 
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may ask the fate of a parent’s brood in case the parent dies during the n time steps. 
Perhaps the whole brood will instantly die due to the lack of parental provisioning, 
which will change the transition matrix in equation 2.1. This difficulty to intuitively 
understand the model situation is common in evolutionary models of class-structured 
populations, and can be overcome by following Taylor’s (1990; 1996) suggestion: “an 
individual who survives to the next generation with probability p is regarded as dying 
and contributing p “offspring” to the appropriate class” (Taylor, 1996, p. 663). Thus, an 
average parent in the current model can be regarded as producing ψ “offspring” to the 
parental class as well as f real offspring to the age-1 class. Each age-i offspring 
produces φi “offspring” to the age i+1 class. Since individuals of different age classes 
differ in terms of the age mix of their “offspring”, we can correctly weight their fitness 
contributions by the corresponding reproductive value, as shown below.  
 
Invasion analysis 
To find the ES allocation strategy among different-aged offspring, we seek under 
what conditions a rare mutant allocation strategy x° (= [ o1x ,…,
o
nx ], where xxx ii Δ+=
o ) 
can invade the resident population fixed for the resident strategy x*. The mutant 
strategy x° is assumed to be rare enough that the average number of age-i offspring per 
mutant adult is given by ∗iu , i.e., the offspring age distribution in the resident 
population with x*. The transition matrix of the mutant subpopulation is: 

























































ooo ϕϕϕ  (see Supplemental data 2.1).  
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The invasion fitness of a mutant strategy x° is sought as the initial growth rate of 
mutant subpopulation in the resident population, i.e., the dominant eigenvalue λ(x°, x*) 
of A(x°, x*) (Metz et al., 1992). Therefore, for a resident strategy x° to be 
evolutionarily stable, λ(x°, x*) should have a local maximum at x° = x* such that:  






x*x ,                     (2.4)   
and the Hessian matrix of λ( °x , x*) is negative semi-definite (i.e., all of its eigenvalues 
is less than or equal to zero) at the equilibrium point ( *x1 ,…, 
*
nx ) (Leimar, 2001; Day & 
Taylor, 2003). The first-order condition for a strategy x* to be an ESS can be rewritten 
as the following n equations: 








  (i = 1,…, n).          (2.5) 
Note that, although the correct fitness measure of a rare mutant strategy x° is λ(x°, x*), 
we can instead use W(x°, x*) = v*A(x°, x*)u* as the fitness function because ∂λ/∂x° 
and ∂W/∂x° have the same sign (Taylor & Frank, 1996). From equation 2.5 and 
Supplemental data 2.1, a parent’s ES allocation strategy x* (= ][ 1
∗∗
nx,...,x ) is obtained by 
n equilibrium conditions as follows: 






















                   (2.6) 








. The n equilibrium conditions emphasize that the n trait values comprising 
the vector of allocation strategy are coevolving. Equation 2.6 indicates that, at the ES 
allocation from a parent’s viewpoint, the marginal benefit of additional resources to 
each offspring’s survival )( ∗′ ii xϕ , weighted by the survival probability of each offspring 
to the reproducing age (i.e., ∗∗+
∗
+ nii ...ϕϕϕ 21 ), is equal to the marginal cost of current total 
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expenditure to the parent’s residual survival )( ∗′ xEψ . The second-order condition for 
evolutionary stability, as well as the condition for convergence stability, is checked in 
Supplemental data 2.2. 
 
RESULTS 
To derive concrete predictions on the parental ES allocation of resources among 
different-aged offspring, I allow the effect of additional resources on younger 
offspring’s survival to be greater than on older offspring’s survival, in accordance with 
previous research (Clutton-Brock, 1991; Rubenstein, 1982; Sargent & Gross, 1986; 
West-Eberhard, 1975). There are two general situations where a younger offspring 
would have higher needs for food than an older offspring. First, the marginal benefit of 
additional resources may be always higher for a younger offspring than an older 
offspring, no matter how much resources were already provided during a given feeding 
episode. Alternatively, the marginal benefit of resources may be higher for a younger 
offspring only when the resources already provided are none or few (i.e., when both 
offspring are equally hungry); if the resources provided are relatively high (i.e., when 
both offspring were equally fed well), the marginal gain of additional resources would 
be higher for the older offspring. Indeed, once enough resources have been equally 
distributed between the older and younger offspring, the latter’s survival will hardly 
increase with additional resources whereas the former’s survival will still have room to 
increase. The second situation appears more plausible and is what previous researchers 
have had in mind (Clutton-Brock, 1991; Rubenstein, 1982; Sargent & Gross, 1986). In 
both situations, I assume that a parent completely controls both the total amount of 
resources delivered and the division of the resources to each individual offspring.  
The ES pattern of parental resource allocation can be obtained as follows. The 
survival probability of an offspring is assumed to increase with the resources provided, 
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with diminishing returns (i.e., ϕ΄(x) > 0, ϕ˝(x) < 0) (e.g., Smith & Fretwell, 1974). 
Consider two offspring spaced by one time step. At evolutionary equilibrium, each 
offspring will receive its ES level of resources (i.e., ∗ix  and
∗
+1ix , where i = 1,…, n −1) 
from the parent. Since ϕ΄(x) is a decreasing function of x, whether ∗ix  is larger or 
smaller than ∗+1ix can be determined by comparing the younger offspring’s marginal 
return at ∗ix  with its marginal return at 
∗
+1ix (i.e., comparing )(
∗′ ii xϕ with )( 1
∗
+′ ii xϕ , 
respectively). Let us denote )( ∗′ ii xϕ − )( 1
∗
+′ ii xϕ by δ. Reflecting the equilibrium conditions 
in equation 2.6, δ can be rewritten as: 




















ϕϕϕδ ,            (2.8) 
the sign of which informs whether ∗ix  is larger or smaller than 
∗
+1ix . For instance, the 
plus sign of δ indicates that ∗ix  is less than 
∗
+1ix  (i.e., the older offspring receives more 
resources than the younger offspring at ESS). 
 
A younger offspring yields higher marginal returns for every level of resources 
provided 
If a younger offspring could obtain a higher marginal return than an older 
offspring for every level of resources provided by the parent during a given feeding 
episode (i.e., )(xiϕ′ > )(1 xi+′ϕ  for all x), then it can be shown that δ = )(
∗′ ii xϕ − )( 1
∗
+′ ii xϕ  
> 0 for all levels of x (see Supplemental data 2.3 for the proof). Since ϕ΄(x) decreases 
with x, it is revealed that ∗ix <
∗
+1ix . Therefore, rather surprisingly, if a younger offspring 
yields higher marginal returns than an older offspring for every level of resources 
provided during a feeding bout, then the parent’s ES allocation strategy x* (= ][ 1
∗∗
nx,...,x ) 
is to distribute its resources such that older offspring get more resources than younger 
offspring (i.e., ∗∗∗ <<< nx...xx 21 ).  
I illustrate the above result by assuming explicit functions for an age-i offspring 
survival: 
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                     ϕi(xi) = Ki[1 − exp(−cxi ))],                    (2.9) 
where Ki is a positive constant denoting the asymptotic level of offspring survival (0 < 
Ki ≤1) and c, so-called ‘shape constant’ (Parker et al., 1989), defines the rate at which 
ϕi(xi) rises to Ki. Offspring of distinct ages differ only in their asymptotes: Ki is assumed 
to be larger than Ki+1, which ensures )( ∗′ ii xϕ > )( 1
∗
+′ ii xϕ  for every value of x (Fig. 2.2a). 
In other words, the asymptote Ki of an age-i offspring survival curve will be inversely 
related to the offspring’s age: K1 > K2 > … > Kn. Throughout this chapter, I assume that 
the parent’s residual survival is an exponentially decreasing function of current parental 
expenditure (i.e., each increment of parental investment is more costly than the previous 
increment): 







),           (2.10)  
where a and b are positive parameters that specify how the total amount of resources 
provided to the current brood reduces the parent’s residual survival and G is a positive 
constant. The ES allocation of resources in asynchronous broods with two offspring is 
given in Fig. 2b. Despite (in fact, because of) the younger offspring’s higher marginal 
return for any level of resources provided, the parent will invest more resources into the 
older offspring than the younger offspring. It can also be seen that the larger the 
difference between the asymptotes of each offspring (i.e., the larger the age spacing 































































Figure 2.2. A situation in which a younger offspring yields higher marginal returns than 
an older offspring, for every level of resources provided. (a) The survival 
probabilities of each offspring (ϕ(x)) as a function of the resources 
provided (x) during a single feeding episode. The slope of the tangent line 
to a survival curve at the point (x,ϕ(x)), that is, ∂ϕ(x)/∂x, is higher for the 
younger offspring’s curve ϕ1 than the older offspring’s curve ϕ2, no matter 
what value of x may be. Parameters are K1 = 0.9, K2 = 0.9, and c =3. (b) 
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The ES amounts of resources (x*) that the parent will deliver to each 
offspring, when the older offspring’s asymptote K2 is varied with the 
younger offspring’s asymptote K1 being fixed at 0.9. The equilibrium 
values were obtained from eqn 6 for two different-aged 
offspring: ))(()()()( 2111221122
∗∗∗∗∗∗ +′−=′=′ xxffxxxx ϕψϕϕϕ . Other parameters 
are c =3, f = 1, a = 0.1, and b =1. 
 
A younger offspring yields higher marginal returns only when the resources 
already provided are none or few. 
Suppose that a younger offspring yields a higher marginal return than an older 
offspring with none or few resources provided, but it yields a lower marginal return 
with high resources. In this situation, it can be proved that δ = )( ∗′ ii xϕ − )( 1
∗
+′ ii xϕ  is 
positive and hence ∗ix <
∗
+1ix  (see Supplemental data 2.4 for the proof). Therefore, as in 
the previous situation, the parent’s ES allocation is to bias its resources in favor of older 
offspring (i.e., ∗∗∗ <<< nx...xx 21 ). 
To illustrate the above result, let an age-i offspring’s survival be given by 
                    ϕi (xi) = K[1 − exp(−ci xi))],                   (2.11) 
where the shape constant ci is allowed to vary according to offspring’s distinct age. To 
ensure that )( ∗′ ii xϕ > )( 1
∗
+′ ii xϕ  for small values of x and yet )(
∗′ ii xϕ < )( 1
∗
+′ ii xϕ  for large 
values of x, ci is assumed to be larger than ci+1. In other words, the shape constant ci of 
an age-i offspring survival curve will be inversely related to the offspring’s age: c1 > c2 
> … > cn (Fig. 2.3a) (Sargent & G(Clutton-Brock, 1991; Sargent & Gross, 1986). This 
is consistent with the honest-signaling models’ assumption that the survival curve of 
‘needier’ (hence younger) offspring is regarded as having a greater c value; yet the 
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honest-signaling models (incorrectly) contend that the younger offspring yields a higher 
marginal return no matter what value of x is provided (Godfray, 1991, 1995a).  
Figure 2.3b gives the ES allocation of resources among two different-aged 
offspring with the younger offspring’s shape constant c1 being fixed at a certain value. 
As expected, despite the younger offspring’s higher marginal return with none or few 
resources provided, the parent will preferentially invest into the older offspring over the 
range of the older offspring’s shape constant c2 (i.e., when the age difference between 
two offspring is varied). The graph also reveals that, as c2 decreases while c1 is fixed 
(hence the older offspring’s age increases compared to the younger offspring’s fixed 
age), the older offspring’s resource share increases and the younger offspring resource 
share, to a lesser extent, decreases. In other words, the larger the age spacing between 
two siblings, the more favored the older offspring.  
In terms of the explicit functions examined above, the survival curves of younger 
and older offspring may differ both in their asymptotic levels of survival (K) and in their 
shape constants (c). This case is, however, a variation of the second situation in which a 
younger offspring yields higher marginal returns only when the resources provided are 
none or few. Hence the main conclusion of biased allocation toward older offspring 
remains the same (Supplemental data 2.4). On the other hand, it can be argued that two 
different-aged offspring will differ in their minimum threshold levels of resources for 
their survival probabilities to start increasing. For instance, the older offspring tend to 
have a larger body size, thereby requiring a higher threshold level of resources than the 
younger offspring. I investigated the consequence of different threshold levels of 
resources between siblings. The analysis revealed that parents will still bias their 
resources in favor of the older offspring, as long as the older offspring’s threshold level 
of resources is greater than or equal to the younger offspring’s threshold. An 
‘exceptional’ allocation favoring the younger offspring may take place if the younger 
offspring’s threshold is sufficiently greater than the older offspring’s one; yet it seems 
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difficult to imagine how a younger offspring’s threshold level of resources could be 


























































Figure 2.3. A situation in which a younger offspring yields higher marginal returns than 
an older offspring only when the amount of resources provided is none or 
few. (a) The survival probabilities of each offspring (ϕ(x)) as a function of 
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the resources provided (x) during a single feeding episode. With a low 
value of x, the slope of the tangent line to a survival curve at the point 
(x,ϕ(x)), that is, ∂ϕ(x)/∂x, is higher for the younger offspring’s curve ϕ1 
than the older offspring’s curve ϕ2; when x is relatively high, the slope of 
the tangent line is higher for the older offspring’s curve ϕ2. Parameters are 
K = 0.9, c1 = 6, and c2 = 2. (b) The ES amounts of resources (x*) that the 
parent will deliver to each offspring, when the older offspring’s shape 
constant c2 is varied with the younger offspring’s shape constant c1 being 
fixed at 6. The equilibrium values were obtained from equation 2.6 for two 
different-aged offspring: )()( 1122
∗∗ ′ xx ϕϕ = )( 22
∗′ xϕ = ))(( 1121
∗∗∗ +′− xfxfx ϕψ . 
Other parameters are K = 0.9, f = 1, a = 0.1, and b =1. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Using an evolutionary invasion analysis in class-structured populations, the 
current model analyzed how a parent should distribute its limited resources among 
offspring of different ages. At the parent’s ESS, the marginal benefit to each offspring’s 
survival, weighted by the survival probability to the reproductive age, is equal to the 
marginal cost to the parent’s residual survival. Following previous discussions, I 
considered two general situations in which younger offspring obtain a higher marginal 
return from additional resources than older offspring. It was predicted that a parent 
would bias its resources in favor of older offspring in nearly all circumstances. The 
degree of parental favoritism will increase as the age spacing between two offspring 
increases. 
Comparison with traditional allocation theory 
Traditional theory for the allocation of limited resources among alternative options 
suggests that, when offspring vary in quality (e.g., offspring age, sex, or condition), a 
 28
parent’s optimal allocation is to adjust its investment such that the marginal returns in 
each offspring are all equal (Haig, 1990; Lloyd, 1985, 1988; Temme, 1986). 
Accordingly, when offspring are of different ages, a parent’s optimal allocation of 
resources would be to allocate resources in a way that the marginal gains of each 
offspring’s survival are all identical at evolutionary equilibrium: 
)( 11
*xϕ′ = )( 22
*xϕ′ =…= )( *nn xϕ′ = )( 1
*
n
* x...x ++′−ψ , where ϕ′i (xi*) is the marginal gain of 
offspring survival by investing into an age-i offspring and )( 1
*
n
* x...x ++′ψ  is the 
marginal cost of current expenditure to the parent’s residual survival.  
By contrast, the class-structured model presented here shows that the parental ESS 
is to equalize the marginal gains of each offspring’s survival that are devalued by the 
survival probability to the reproducing age (equation 2.6). In this scheme, the various 
consequences of the parental actor’s investment on the recipient offspring structured 
into different classes are measured on a common scale, i.e., to what extent current 
investment into an age-i offspring eventually contributes to the offspring’s growth into a 
reproducing adult. Interestingly, due to the weighting of the survival probability to the 
reproducing age, the marginal gain from a younger offspring must be higher than an 
older offspring at the parental ESS: )( 11
*xϕ′  > )( 22
*xϕ′  > … > )( *nn xϕ′ = )(
∗′− xEψ (see 




++′ iiii xx ϕϕ > )( 11
∗
++′ ii xϕ ). Contrary to 
the traditional allocation theory insisting the equilibration of marginal gains across all 
offspring at ESS, the model presented here sheds new insights into the evolution of 
parental investment allocation: the marginal gains from each offspring are not 
necessarily equal at ESS. Rather, when offspring are structured into different age 
classes, the marginal gains from younger offspring will be greater than those from older 
offspring at the parental ESS. What are equalized in this case are the marginal gains 
from each offspring that are devalued by the survival probability to the reproducing age. 
Although the model presented here does not take into account the role of offspring 
begging, the fact that younger offspring obtain a higher marginal return than older 
 29
offspring (i.e., they are ‘needier’) at evolutionary equilibrium may partly explain why 
younger offspring tend to beg more vigorously than older offspring in real situations. 
 
Implications for models of intrafamilial conflict    
The two counteracting effects of offspring growth on parental resource allocation 
were thought to be 1) older offspring’s higher reproductive value (hence parents should 
prefer older offspring) and 2) younger offspring’s higher fitness increment with extra 
resources (hence parents should prefer younger offspring) (Clutton-Brock, 1991). After 
constructing a structured-population model based on reproductive value, I allowed 
younger offspring to gain a higher marginal return with additional resources than older 
offspring, in two general situations. Consequently, the model presented here 
disentangles and integrates the two counteracting effects of offspring’s growth on 
parental allocation of resources. 
Under nearly all circumstances, the model provides a clear-cut prediction that a 
parent will preferentially invest into an older offspring over a younger offspring. An 
‘exceptional’ allocation favoring younger offspring is possible only when the younger 
offspring’s threshold level of resources is sufficiently greater than the older offspring’s 
one, which may be rare in real populations. Nevertheless, there are a handful of studies 
reporting equal allocation of resources or biased allocation toward younger offspring in 
asynchronously hatched broods (e.g., Krebs et al., 1999; Leonard & Horn, 1996; 
Stamps, Clark, Arrowood, & Kus, 1985). It would be interesting to investigate if the 
precondition of ‘exceptional’ allocation is fulfilled in such species.  
Provided that parents win the parent-offspring conflict and hence can impose the 
parental optimum, the main prediction of biased allocation toward older offspring may 
well account for the widespread yet enigmatic phenomenon in most asynchronously 
hatching birds: younger nestlings indeed receive less food than older nestlings, even 
 30
though the former beg more intensively (Cotton et al., 1999; Kilner, 1995; Lotem, 1998; 
Price et al., 1996; Price & Ydenberg, 1995; Smiseth & Amundsen, 2002). Existing 
models of parent-offspring interactions, lacking in the formal analysis of class-
structured populations, have failed to explain such phenomenon. In particular, the 
honest-signaling models have predicted that parents should bias their resources toward 
the needier (i.e., younger) offspring, which runs counter to abundant empirical data. The 
model presented here thus provides a straightforward solution for the hitherto 
unresolved problem. 
In addition to the lack of formal analysis of class-structured populations, the 
honest signaling models suffer a conceptual problem in defining offspring’s cryptic 
condition (or ‘need’) in terms of the shape constant c of offspring survival functions. In 
such models, ‘needier’ offspring (hungrier offspring as the short-term need; younger 
(smaller) offspring as the long-term need) correspond to those yielding a higher 
marginal gain from additional resources (i.e., ∂ϕ/∂x) (Price et al., 1996). Unfortunately, 
in presenting an explicit example for their analysis, the honest-signaling theorists 
assumed that needier offspring also correspond to those having a lower value of c in 
their survival functions compared to their sibling (Godfray, 1991, 1995b). In reality, as 
the Results section shows, the c value of the survival curves does not reliably reflect the 
marginal gain from extra resources (∂ϕ/∂x): the survival curve with a higher c value 
may yield either a higher or lower marginal gain than the curve with a lower c value, 
depending on the amount of resources already provided x (see Fig. 2.3a) (Parker et al., 
2002a; Royle, Hartley, & Parker, 2002). Hence, in the honest-signaling models’ 
terminology, younger offspring should not be regarded as being always ‘needier’, 
because they will obtain a higher marginal return only when the resources provided are 
none or few. Future research should focus on clarifying the ambiguous terms like 
offspring ‘need’ and ‘condition’ found in current literature.  
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Limitations and conclusions 
One caveat of the present study is its simplistic assumption that parents always 
win the parent-offspring conflict and hence the amount of resources transferred in 
nature is at the parental optimum. Yet the optimal resource allocation from the 
perspective of each different-aged offspring will actually differ from one another, and it 
is possible that offspring may (at least partly) win the conflict. Future research should 
address how the evolutionary conflict among various family members is resolved within 
an age-dependent life-history context. Furthermore, the present study should be 
distinguished from Lack’s (1947, 1954) interpretation of hatching asynchrony as a low-
cost means of adjusting brood size by imposing within-brood competitive asymmetries. 
The present study simply asked how parents should allocate their resources within 
asynchronously hatched broods, but not how adaptive brood reduction is made possible 
due to hatching asynchrony. Nevertheless, the insight that it is in parental interests for 
older offspring to get more foods may help explain why parents set up within-brood 
competitive asymmetries in the first place. 
Although the theories of intrafamilial conflict, by their very nature, deal with 
social interactions between individuals of different classes, they have been slow to 
explicitly model the evolution of class-structured populations. The class-structured 
model presented here asked how the parental actor’s behavior is modulated by the fact 
that its recipient offspring are not identical but classified into distinct age classes. The 
model’s central prediction appears to well account for the hitherto puzzling 
phenomenon in view of extant theories, which suggests that the study of intrafamilial 
conflict and parental investment would benefit from taking advantage of the invasion 
analysis tool in class-structured populations. 
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SUPPLEMENTAL DATA  
2.1. Reproductive values and stable age distribution 
Assuming that λ remains at 1 due to the density-dependent regulation, the vector 
of individual reproductive values v* = ][ 1
∗∗∗
pn v,v,...,v  in the resident population be 
determined up to a scalar constant from the recurrence equation v*A* = v*. Since the 
eigenvector v* can be scaled at will, I choose the reproductive value of parents ∗pv  to 
equal 1. Then the reproductive value of each offspring class is: 





kiv ϕ  (i = 1,…, n)                 (2A.1) 
Likewise, the vector of stable age distribution u* = ][ 1
∗∗∗
pn u,u,...,u  can be 
determined up to a constant from the recurrence equation u*A* = u*. By choosing the 
relative number of parental class ∗pu to 1, I obtain the relative number of each offspring 
class: 








ki fu ϕ  (i = 2,…, n)                 (2A.2) 
and u1 is defined as f.  
 
2.2. Evolutionary stability and convergence stability 
Here I show that the Hessian matrix (a matrix of second partial derivatives) of 
λ(x°, x*) is negative semi-definite at the equilibrium point ( *x1 ,…, 
*
nx ) (Day & Taylor, 
2003; Leimar, 2001). In order to obtain the derivative of λ(x°, x*) with respect to a 
mutant strategy y, I use the following equation shown by Taylor and Frank (1996): 


























,         (2A.3) 
where v* and u* are derived from the resident matrix A*(x*, x*). Assuming that there 
is no genetic correlation between each trait value xi, and reflecting equations 2.2 and 
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2A.3, I obtain the vector of the derivative of λ(x°, x*) with respect to a mutant strategy 














































,  (2A.4) 
where prime denotes differentiation of a function with respect to its argument and i is 
from 1 to n. 











)λ(2 .                    (2A.5) 
In order for M to be negative semi-definite at the equilibrium point (x1*,…, xn*), zTMz 
should be zero or negative for all nonzero vectors z. Recall that an age-i offspring 
survival φi(xi) was assumed to increase with the amount of resources provided, with 
diminishing returns: ∂2φi(xi)/∂xi 2 < 0. No genetic correlation was assumed among each 
different-aged offspring’s resource share: ∂2φi(xi)/∂xi∂xj = 0, where i ≠ j. Moreover, the 
parent’s residual survival was assumed to be a decreasing, concave-down function of 
current total expenditure: 22 )/( xx EE ∂∂ ψ < 0. Taking these into account, one can see that 
zTMz is zero or negative for all nonzero vectors z. Therefore, the function λ(x, x*) has a 
local maximum at the equilibrium point (x1*, x2*,…, xn*). Note that the same result is 
obtained even when the parent’s residual survival is assumed to linearly decrease with 
the current total expenditure. 
Another stability criterion called convergence stability ensures the evolutionary 
attainability through a series of small steps (Eshel, 1983; Eshel & Motro, 1981). Denote 
by x̂  (= εx° + (1− ε)x*) the mean of parental allocation strategy in a population with a 
rare mutant x° at frequency ε and the ES strategy x* at frequency (1− ε) with ε being 
small. Multidimensional convergence stability requires that the so-called Jacobian 






















)λ( ,                  (2A.6) 
be negative definite at the equilibrium point ( *x1 ,…, 
*
nx ) (Leimar, 2005; Otto & Day, 
2007). The negative definiteness can be checked in the same manner as above; hence 
the equilibrium point ( *x1 ,…, 
*
nx ) is convergence stable. 
 
2.3. The pattern of ES allocation when )(xiϕ′ > )(1 xi+′ϕ  for all positive x 
Equation 2.8 reveals that δ can be regarded as a function of ∗+1ix  only. 
Differentiating δ( ∗+1ix ) with respect to 
∗
+1ix , we obtain the following: 































ϕϕϕϕϕδ < 0,    (2A.7) 
which means that δ( ∗+1ix ) is a decreasing function of 
∗
+1ix .  
Since the survival probability must lie in between 0 and 1, I assume that )(xiϕ  
approaches an asymptote of Ki and  )(1 xi+ϕ approaches Ki+1 as x approaches infinity (0 
< Ki+1 < Ki ≤ 1, because )(xiϕ′ > )(1 xi+′ϕ  for all positive x). In other words, both )(xiϕ′  
and )(1 xi+′ϕ approaches zero as x approaches infinity, which implies that δ(
∗
+1ix ) 
approaches zero as ∗+1ix  approaches infinity. Since δ(
∗




+1ix ) has a positive value for all 
∗
+1ix . Thus 
∗
ix  is lower than 
∗




2.4. The pattern of ES allocation when )(xiϕ′ > )(1 xi+′ϕ only for small values of x 
Denote by x~  the specific value of x at which )(1 xi+′ϕ becomes equal to )(xiϕ′ . 
That is, )(xiϕ′ > )(1 xi+′ϕ  for x < x~  but )(xiϕ′ < )(1 xi+′ϕ  for x > x~ . First, consider 
∗
+1ix  
the value of which is greater than x~ . Given that )( 1
∗
+ii xϕ > )( 11
∗
++ ii xϕ  and 
)( 1
∗
+′ ii xϕ < )( 11
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Hence ∗ix  is lower than 
∗
+1ix  for 
∗
+1ix > x~ .  
Second, consider  ∗+1ix  the value of which is less than or equal to x~ . The 
decreasing function δ( ∗+1ix ) has its minimum value at 
∗
+1ix = x~ . The minimum value is 
positive as follows: 





























ϕδ           (2A.9) 
Hence δ( ∗+1ix ) is positive, which means that 
∗
ix  is lower than 
∗
+1ix  for 
∗
+1ix ≤ x~ . 
In sum, ∗ix  is lower than 
∗







Chapter 3: Parental Resource Allocation in Humans: An Empirical 
Test of Competing Evolutionary Hypotheses 
 
SUMMARY  
How do parents allocate their limited resources among different children? 
Darwinian perspective suggests that natural selection has favored discriminative 
parental psychology that makes unequal distribution of parental resources among 
offspring in a way that maximizes parental fitness. A few evolutionary hypotheses of 
human parental favoritism based on offspring birth order thus far have been suggested: 
Sulloway’s (1996: 2001) family dynamics model, Hertwig, Davis, and Sulloway’s 
(2002) equity heuristic model, and Jeon’s (chapter 2) game-theoretic model. This study 
empirically tested the competing predictions derived from each hypothesis, by asking 
human parents to hypothetically allocate tangible resources like food and money among 
children. Participants allocated more resources to the older children than the younger 
children, confirming the predictions of Jeon’s game-theoretic model. Neither family 
dynamics model nor equity heuristic model was empirically validated. The functional 
organization of psychological adaptations for allocating parental resources among 
different children is discussed.  
        
INTRODUCTION 
One of the unique characteristics in the human family is that immature offspring 
have a very long developmental period, relative to other primates, and are highly 
dependent on parental caregiving (Geary & Flinn, 2001; Kaplan & Gangestad, 2005). 
Even after weaning, children continue to require substantial investment in feeding and 
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protection from their parents. Since offspring in a family may differ in their general 
qualities such as age, sex, size, and physical health, parents might make unequal 
distribution of parental resources among their offspring. Indeed, traditional 
psychologists have long recognized that parents often treat their children differently, 
demonstrating that parental favoritism is linked to a problem in the social and emotional 
development of children (e.g., Brody, Stoneman, & Burke, 1987; Dunn, Stocker, & 
Plomin, 1990; Stocker, Dunn, & Plomin, 1989). It has remained unexplored, however, 
how parents are expected to divide their resources among various offspring. 
An evolutionary perspective can provide the theoretical framework for analyzing 
parental psychology. Natural selection may have shaped discriminative mechanisms of 
parental care that unequally distribute parental resources among various offspring so as 
to maximize parental fitness (Daly & Wilson, 1988a; Daly & Wilson, 1995; Salmon, 
2005; C. C. Smith & Fretwell, 1974; Winkler, 1987). Among many factors affecting the 
distribution pattern of parental resources, offspring age is of special concern for family 
researchers because offspring age is correlated with sibling differences in size, power, 
experience, and status within the family. Unfortunately, how a parent should allocate its 
resources among its senior and junior offspring has been considered a vexing problem 
for theoretical biologists, due to mutually counteracting effects of offspring growth on 
parental investment (PI) (Clutton-Brock, 1991, see chapter 2). The younger or smaller 
of two offspring may benefit more from an (infinitesimally small) unit of additional 
food, in terms of its increased survival probability. In other words, the younger 
offspring has higher needs for food than the older offspring (Sargent & Gross, 1986). 
However, the older or bigger offspring is closer to reproductive maturity and hence has 
higher reproductive value, i.e., greater genetic contribution far into the future 
generations (Fisher, 1930), than the younger offspring. Since it seemed that both the 
older and younger offspring may have reasonable reason to be favored by parents, 
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evolutionary psychologists in earlier eras have failed to give a conclusive answer for 
which offspring would be favored (Daly & Wilson, 1988b; Daly & Wilson, 1995).  
Recently, several evolutionary hypotheses of parental resource allocation in 
humans have been suggested. First of all, in his family dynamics model of birth order 
effects, Sulloway (1996; 2001) suggested that parents would preferentially invest in 
both their firstborns and lastborns, while relatively neglecting their middleborns. It 
appears that Sulloway (1996; 2001) simply combined the two counteracting effects of 
offspring growth on parental decision rules — reproductive value favors the elder and 
the impact of additional resources on offspring survival (‘neediness’) favors the younger 
(Daly & Wilson, 1995) — and predicted a U-shaped pattern of parental resource 
distribution over offspring birth order for sibships of three or more. It is difficult, 
however, for Sulloway’s (2001) model to make predictions for sibships of two (Rohde 
et al., 2003; Sulloway, 2001).  
Second, Hertwig, Davis, and Sulloway (2002) proposed the ‘equity heuristic’ as 
parental allocation decision rule, with which parents should attempt to equally divide 
resources among their children at any given time. They noted that such a motive of 
equity would still produce inequality in the cumulative amount of PI over the whole 
caring period, in a way that middleborns would receive fewer cumulative PI than 
firstborns and lastborns. The counterintuitive implication results from the fact that 
firstborns and lastborns experience some period as the only child in the family, whereas 
middleborns always have to share parental resources with other siblings (see Figure 3.1) 
(Herwig et al., 2002). An equal allocation is predicted for sibships of two, both at any 
given time and over the entire period of caregiving. The rationale behind the equity 
heuristic is that a parent is equally related to each of its offspring by 0.5 degree of 





Figure 3.1. A diagram showing how the equity heuristic can result in unequal 
distribution of cumulative investment among offspring. Spheres in the 
upper part of the figure represent resource allocation according to the 
equity heuristic as a function of birth rank in families with one, two, and 
three children. The bars in the lower part show the absolute and relative 
(i.e., calculated as a proportion of that for an only child) cumulative 
investments across four growth periods (“years”).  
Source: Herwig, R., Davis, J. N., & Sulloway, F. J. (2002). Parental investment: how an 
equity motive can produce inequality. Psychological Bulletin, 128, 728-
745. Reprinted with permission. 
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Third, in his game-theoretic model of parental resource allocation, Jeon (chapter 
1) formally disentangled the two countervailing effects of offspring growth on parental 
allocation decision. The game-theoretic model determined a parent’s evolutionarily 
stable strategy (ESS), i.e., a strategy such that, if all members of the population adopt it, 
then no other mutant strategy could invade the population (Maynard Smith & Price, 
1973).  The parental ESS is to distribute resources such that the marginal benefits to 
each offspring, weighted by each offspring’s survival probability to the reproducing 
age, are identical across all offspring. And then, within the model’s reproductive-value 
framework, the younger offspring’s fitness increment with additional resources 
(‘neediness’) was assumed to be higher than the older offspring. It was found that, 
under these circumstances, the parental ESS at a single point in time is to bias parental 
resources in favor of older offspring: that is, the offspring birth rank will be inversely 
associated with the amount of resources allocated by parents. Since such a life-history 
model typically assumes that the respective amounts of PI to the offspring of each age 
do not change over evolutionary history, the cumulative amounts of PI that each 
offspring would have received at the end of caring period are identical, irrespective of 
offspring birth order. 
The central aim of the present chapter is to empirically test the competing 
evolutionary hypotheses of parental favoritism among different-aged children using a 
questionnaire study of hypothetical allocation. The alternative models make distinct 
predictions regarding the allocation pattern of parental resources among children at any 
given point in time (see Table 3.1). Specifically, for sibships of two, Sulloway’s (1996; 
2001) family dynamics model appears not make any predictions; Hertwig et al.’s (2002) 
equity heuristic model predicts equal allocation; and Jeon’s (chapter 2) game-theoretic 
model predicts biased allocation toward the older offspring. For sibships of three or 
more, Sulloway (1996; 2001) predicts U-shaped allocation of resources with the 
middleborns receiving the least; Hertwig et al. (2002) predicts equal allocation; and 
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Jeon (chapter 2) predicts biased allocation toward the older offspring. I conducted a 
survey study in which parents were asked to allocate a certain amount of food among 
two or three children in hypothetical situations. Although parental investment consists 
of not a single, tangible resource but qualitatively different kinds of resources 
(Borgerhoff Mulder, 1998; Herwig et al., 2002), food provisioning may be the most 
critical component of parental caregiving in many species, including humans. The 
anatomical features of human childhood, such as an immature dentition (“milk teeth”) 
and small digestive tracts, strongly suggest that food provisioning has been a recurrent 
adaptive problem for human parents throughout evolutionary history (Bogin, 1997). 
Additionally, I performed exploratory studies of parental resource allocation when the 
resources are time and money.      
 
Table 3.1. A comparison of competing predictions derived from alternative evolutionary 
hypotheses for parental differential treatment among different-aged 
children. 
 
At any given point in time 
 
Two children Three or more children 
Cumulative PI at the 




























Participants were approached at a large outdoor park in Austin, Texas, and asked 
to complete a questionnaire. We recruited only adults having at least two genetic 
children. A total of 109 participants who met the eligibility criteria provided informed 
consent and participated in the study. Of these, seven participants were excluded from 
the sample because of incomplete data. The responses of the remaining 102 participants 
(49 males, 53 females) of ages 22 to 70 years (M = 41.53, SD = 10.93) were analyzed. 
Upon completion, participants were thanked for their participation and debriefed. All 
participants were volunteers and received no compensation. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants first provided demographic information (age, sex, ethnicity, and 
socioeconomic status). They were instructed to allocate three qualitatively different 
types of parental investment (food, time, and money, which were counterbalanced in 
random orders) to their hypothetical two/three children. For two children scenario, 
participants were asked to imagine that the younger child was a 3-year-old child and the 
older was 7-year-old child. The procedures was to reflect the fact that the world-wide 
median age of weaning is reported as 36 months after birth (Dettwyler, 1995). For three 
children scenario, the firstborn was 9-year-old, the middleborn was 6-year-old, and the 
lastborn was 3-year-old. Participants were advised not to consider the sex of children. In 
the case of food allocation task, the two children scenario was as follows:  
 
Suppose that you are the parent of two offspring: a 3-year-old child and a 7-year-
old child. One evening you came home late and your children seemed to feel very 
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hungry. Fortunately, there was a vast pot of soup in the refrigerator. The pot of soup 
was so huge that it could satisfy a lot of children’s hunger simultaneously. In order to 
make your children’s late dinner, you took off an appropriate amount of soup from the 
pot and warmed it up…. Given that the soup you warmed up constitutes 100%, please 
indicate how you would like to allocate the food among between your older and 
younger offspring. Make sure that the sum of two percentages is 100. 
 
 In the case of time allocation task, participants were asked to imagine that they 
came home late one evening and found that their two or three children caught a cold. 
Given that participants had only one hour to take care of their children, but not 
simultaneously, they were asked 1) to choose which offspring to look after in the first 
place and 2) to allocate 60 minutes among their two or three children.   
In the case of money allocation task, participants were asked to imagine that they 
had it a rule to allow their two or three children some pocket money every month. Given 
that participants were going to give 10 dollars to their two or three children this month, 
they were asked to allocate 10 dollars among their two or three children. Unlike 
previous allocation tasks, the ages of children age slightly went up to reflect the fact that 
small children need not money at all. For two children scenario, the younger was 7-
year-old child and the older was 10-year-old child. For three children scenario, the 
firstborn was 11-year-old, the middleborn was 8-year-old, and the lastborn was 5-year-
old.  
For each allocation task, it was emphasized that each child will never know of 
other children’s share and hence will not complain about the participants’ allocation 
decision. An open-ended question on why participants allocated in that way was 




The dependent variable was percentage of parental resources (food, time, and 
money) allocated to each offspring with a specific birth order. Although it is generally 
useful to transform such proportion data by using arcsine or logit transformations, these 
transformations tend to have little effect if most or all of the proportion data values are 
between about .2 and .8 (Judd & McClelland, 1989, pp. 525-526), which is the case of 
my data. The analyses were therefore done on untransformed data. It was confirmed that 
transformed data using arcsine transformation yield identical results.   
Participants’ responses to open-ended questions were coded independently by two 
trained, research assistants. The inter-rater agreements for each allocation task were 95 
percent (food), 94 percent (time), and 89 percent (money). Any disagreements between 
coders were resolved by the investigator.  
 
RESULTS 
Preliminary analyses of each allocation task did not find any significant main 
effects or interactions for the sex of participants (ps > .05). Therefore, the data were 
collapsed across male and female participants in subsequent analyses.     
 
Food allocation task 
A repeated measures ANOVA on the percentage of food allocated to each child 
was conducted for the two children scenario. Consistent with the predictions of Jeon’s 
(chapter 2) game-theoretic model, participants allocated significantly more food to the 
older child (M = 61.57) than the younger child (M = 38.43), F(1, 101) = 195.51, p < 
0.001 (see Figure 3.2a). By contrast, the equal allocation prediction derived from 
Hertwig et al.’s (2002) equity heuristic model was not met. A repeated measures 
ANCOVA with participants’ age as the covariate showed that the difference between 
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the older child’s food share and the younger child’s food share was still significant after 
controlling for the effect of participants’ age, F(1, 100) = 15.54, p < 0.001. Table 3.2 
summarizes the allocation of parental resources among children across all types of 
resources investigated in this study. 
 
Table 3.2. Percentages of various kinds of parental resources allocated to each offspring 
according to offspring birth order.   
 
 Types of parental resources 
 Food Time Money 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Two children       
1st 61.57 8.36 45.10 9.48 56.76 12.99 
2nd 38.43 8.36 55.56 10.25 42.25 12.42 
Three children       
1st 43.65 7.51 28.01 7.86 48.02 12.41 
2nd 32.58 4.15 31.47 4.37 33.73 7.97 
3rd 23.77 6.50 40.36 9.10 18.44 10.95 
 
Similar analyses were performed for three children scenario. The effect of 
offspring birth order (i.e., offspring’s relative age) on the proportion of food allocated 
was significant, F(2, 202) = 175.72, p < 0.001, revealing a significant linear trend, F(1, 
101) = 223.79, p < 0.001. Pairwise comparison tests using the Bonferroni correction 
revealed that participants allocated the most food to the firstborn (M = 43.65), followed 
by the middleborn (M = 32.58), and finally the lastborn (M = 23.77), all pairwise ps < 
0.001 (Figure 3.2b). Therefore, Jeon’s (chapter 2) game-theoretic model that predicts 
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biased allocation of parental resources in favor of older children was confirmed by the 
empirical data. Neither Sulloway’s (1996; 2001) model predicting U-shaped distribution 
nor Hertwig et al.’s (2002) model predicting equal allocation was confirmed. The biased 
allocation pattern toward older children was not influenced by participants’ age 
(repeated measures ANCOVA with participants’ age as the covariate, F(2, 200) = 
19.786, p < 0.001).    
Participants’ responses to the open-ended question about why they allocated in 
that way were content analyzed. Since the responses to both two children scenario and 
three children scenario were nearly identical, only the data for two children scenario are 
presented here. For participants (n = 73) who allocated more food to the older child, 
their responses were classified into three categories: (1) nutrients requirement (55%) 
(e.g., “The older has a bigger stomach (appetite)” and “The older needs more calories”); 
(2) difference in demands (42%) (e.g., “The older needs more food” and “The younger 
needs less food”); (3) and others (3%) (e.g., “I will know how much each offspring will 
eat”). Note that (1) and (2) can be lumped together because both invokes age-specific 
demands. For participants (N = 17) who made equal allocation, their responses were 
classified into three categories: (1) fairness (53%) (e.g., “To show equal love and care” 
and “To be fair”); (2) the irrelevance of age (24%) (e.g., “The appetite cannot be 
measured by age”); and (3) others (24%) (e.g., “I don’t know who has a bigger 
appetite”). Not all participants responded to the open-ended question; thus the total 



































































Figure 3.2. Percentages of food allocated with regard to offspring birth order. (a) two 
children scenario. (b) three children scenario.  
 
 Time allocation task 
To examine the effect of offspring birth order on the percentage of time allocated 
to each offspring, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted for two children 
scenario. Participants allocated significantly more time to the younger child (M = 55.56) 
than to the older child (M = 45.10), F(1, 101) = 32.23, p < 0.001. The biased allocation 
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favoring the younger child was not dependent upon participants’ age (repeated measures 
ANCOVA, F(1, 100) = 4.307, p < 0.05). Among the participants (n = 90) who 
responded to the question about which offspring to look after in the first place, 88% of 
them chose the younger child and 10% chose the older child. Therefore, contrary to the 
previous food allocation task, participants invested more time to the younger child, a 
phenomenon that is not easily explained by any of the competing hypotheses of parental 
resource allocation. When the resource to be distributed at a certain point is time, 
Hertwig et al.’s (2002) model explicitly predicts equal allocation of time.  Jeon’s 
(chapter 2) model is primarily intended for tangible resources like food; the model is 
unable to make predictions for child-care time unless how offspring survival depends on 
child-care time is specifically determined.  
For the three children scenario, the percentages of time allocated were significant 
different across offspring birth order (repeated measures ANOVA, F(2, 202) = 51.407, 
p < 0.001), showing a significant linear trend, F(1, 101) = 58.279, p < 0.001. Pairwise 
comparisons with the Bonferroni adjustment revealed that participants allocated the 
most time to the lastborn (M = 40.36), followed by the middleborn (M = 31.47), and 
finally the firstborn (M = 28.01), all pairwise ps < 0.001. The observed pattern of biased 
allocation in favor of younger children is not consistent with any of the competing 
evolutionary hypotheses.  
Participants’ responses to the open-ended question about why they allocated in 
that way in two children scenario were content analyzed. For participants (n = 34) who 
allocated more time to the younger child, the responses were categorized: vulnerability 
(59%) (e.g., “The younger is more vulnerable” and “The younger has lower immune 
system”); the inability to take care of oneself (32%) (e.g., “The younger is less likely to 
take care of herself”); and others (9%). For participants (n = 44) who allocated equally, 
the responses were classified: (1) fairness (64%) (e.g., “Both are equally important to 
me” and “Both are my children”); (2) identical needs (30%) (e.g., “Both needs equal 
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care”); and others (7%). The number of participants (n = 7) who allocate more time to 
the older child was very small. 
 
Money allocation task 
For two children scenario, repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant main 
effect of birth order on the percentage of money allocated to each child, F(1, 101) = 
39.203, p < 0.001. Participants allocated significantly more money to the older child (M 
= 56.76) than the younger child (M = 42.25). The biased allocation favoring the older 
was also observed for three children scenario. There was a significant main effect of 
birth order on the money allocated (repeated measures ANOVA, F(2, 202) = 132.558, p 
< 0.001), showing a significant linear trend, F(1, 101) = 184.503, p < 0.001. Pairwise 
comparison tests showed that participants allocated the most money to the firstborn (M 
= 48.02), followed by the middleborn (M = 33.73), and the firstborn (M = 18.44), all 
pairwise ps < 0.001. The observed allocation pattern of favoring the older is consistent 
with predictions from Jeon’s (chapter 2) game-theoretic model. It needs to be 
established, however, how parental psychological mechanism of allocating 
evolutionarily relevant resources would operate on the allocation of money, a recent 
invention that emerged only 3,000 years or so (Davies, 2002).     
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DISCUSSION 
In hypothetically allocating tangible resources like food and money at a single 
point in time, participants allocated more resources to the older children than the 
younger children, both for sibships of two and for sibships of three. The results 
confirmed the prediction of Jeon’s (chapter 2) game-theoretic model: offspring birth 
rank will be inversely associated with the amount of resources allocated by the parent. 
Neither the prediction of Sulloway’s (2001) family dynamics model nor that of Hertwig 
et al.’s (2002) equity heuristic model has been empirically validated. In allocating child-
care time at a single moment, however, participants allocated more time to the younger 
children than the older children, a phenomenon that has not been predicted by any of the 
competing evolutionary hypotheses.           
 
Alternative hypotheses of parental investment allocation in humans 
Among the evolutionary hypotheses of parental resource allocation in humans, 
Sulloway’s (1996; 2001) family dynamics model has received the greatest attention and 
stimulated a number of empirical studies (e.g., Rohde et al., 2003; Salmon, 1999; 
Salmon & Daly, 1998). Sulloway’s (1996, 2001) model is, in reality, a grand theory of 
personality and development that stresses the critical role of birth order in shaping 
individual differences. The unequal allocation of parental resources is presented in his 
model as one of the four causal mechanisms resulting in personality differences (note 
that whether birth order influences personality is not the concern of this paper). 
As already described, based on the two counteracting effects of offspring growth 
on parental allocation decision — reproductive value and the impact of additional 
resources on offspring survival (‘neediness) —, Sulloway (1996, 2001) concluded that 
parents will invest the least amount of resources in middleborns. Unfortunately, no 
justification was provided for why reproductive value and ‘neediness’ are expected to 
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affect parental allocation decision independently with each other. The main finding of 
this study, parental favoring of older children regarding tangible resources, shows that it 
should be formally checked, rather than intuitively derived, how reproductive value and 
‘neediness’ could have interacted to impose selection pressures on discriminative 
parental psychology over evolutionary past.  
More precisely, the reproductive value of each offspring should not be regarded as 
one of many factors influencing the fitness benefits to the parental actor: it is a common 
currency, like genetic relatedness, to properly value the fitness benefits derived from 
each offspring (recipients) to the parental actor (Fisher, 1930; Frank, 1998; Taylor, 
1990). With such a reproductive value weighting, Jeon’s (chapter 2) formal model 
demonstrated that the parental ESS is to equalize the marginal benefits of additional 
resources (‘neediness’) to each offspring, weighted by the survival probability to the 
adult age. Note that the survival probability to the adult age is, by definition, is lower 
for the younger offspring. The model thus has the surprising implication that, after a 
parent has made adaptive allocation of resources to maximize parental fitness, the 
younger offspring would be ‘needier’ than the older offspring (though the magnitudes 
of ‘neediness’ must have been greatly reduced for both, as the result of parental 
provisioning). Subsequently, assuming that the younger has a higher need for food than 
the older before the onset of parental provisioning, the model predicts biased allocation 
in favor of older offspring for both sibships of two and three. The empirical results 
gained in this study unequivocally support Jeon’s (chapter 2) game-theoretic model, 
which suggests that formal evolutionary modeling can be very helpful in discovering 
the nature of evolved psychological mechanisms such as resource allocation module 
among different children.       
 In addition to the impact of a unit of additional resources on offspring survival, 
another factor that will lead parents to favor the younger children (particularly the 
lastborn) has been seriously considered by some researchers adopting Sulloway’s 
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(1996; 2001) framework (e.g., Salmon, 1999; Salmon & Daly, 1998). As parents 
themselves grow older, their residual survival probability decreases due to senescence, 
favoring parental investment into current offspring. Hence parental aging may have a 
beneficial effect on the lastborns who are likely to have older parents; this effect will 
reinforce the U-shaped pattern of resource distribution as Sulloway (1996; 2001) 
predicted. The effect of parental aging on parental resource allocation will be salient in 
cumulative PI allocation over the whole caring period, rather than PI allocation at a 
certain moment in time. Since this study tested how human parents would allocate their 
resources among children at a given time, whether parental aging would influence the 
cumulative PI allocation as Salmon and Daly (1998) suggested still remains to be an 
open question. Given that Jeon’s (chapter 2) formal model did not take into account the 
role of parental aging, future work may explore whether Jeon’s (chapter 2) model can 
be accommodated to include the role of parental aging in shaping cumulative PI 
allocation pattern.   
Contrary to Hertwig et al.’s (2002) hypothesis that human parents with enough 
resources may use a decision rule that divides parental investment equally among all of 
their children, the participants in this study who had an unlimited amount of 
hypothetical food to be allocated made unequal distribution in favor of the older 
children (see Fig. 3.2). To be fair, Hertwig et al. (2002) made clear that their aim was 
not to insist that parents are strictly egalitarian no matter what their children’s age-
specific qualities or demands, but to highlight the overlooked possibility that parents 
who treat children equally may end up biasing investment in terms of the cumulative 
amount of parental resources at the end of caring period (Herwig et al., 2002, p. 728). It 
was not made explicit, however, how parents will find a compromise between the equity 
heuristic and an alternative heuristic (e.g., an age-specific decision rule). Hertwig et 
al.’s (2002) primary prediction was, hence, an equal distribution of resources among 
children at a given point in time, which was not confirmed in this study. This may well 
 53
illustrate that, even if it is true that dividing equally requires less information processing 
and calculation effort than other allocation rules (Messick, 1993), what natural selection 
ultimately ‘sees’ is not the energy efficiency of a strategy per se but the relative fitness 
of a certain strategy compared to other strategies in ancestral environments.             
Notably, the observed biased allocation of child-care time favoring the younger 
children was not consistent with any of the competing evolutionary hypotheses. This 
may be especially bad news for Hertwig et al.’s (2002) equity heuristic model, which 
contends that the equity heuristic works best if parental resources is fairly limited and 
stable, like time and attention (Herwig et al., 2002, p. 732). The main difficulty in 
analyzing the result of time allocation task is that, unlike tangible resources like food, 
how offspring survival probability would specifically increase as a function of child-
care time (i.e., the exact shape of offspring survival graph) is largely unknown among 
evolutionary biologists (Clutton-Brock, 1991).  For example, if offspring survival 
linearly increases with the child-care time and the slope of the linear function is higher 
for younger offspring, then Jeon’s (chapter 2) game-theoretic model does predict 
parental favoring of the younger children under reasonable circumstances. The exact 
shape of offspring survival function with regard to child-care time is, of course, to be 
determined empirically.   
 
The design of psychological mechanisms for allocating parental resources among 
children 
Some have suggested that the main findings of the present study, parental favoring 
of the older children in allocating tangible resources like food, can be more 
parsimoniously explained by a theory invoking age-specific demands (here ‘demands’ 
refer to the total amount of food that each child requires to be fully satisfied over a meal 
or a day. The term should be discriminated from the previous term ‘neediness’, the 
marginal benefit of a small unit of food to offspring survival) (N. Li and G. Holden, 
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2007, personal communication). Indeed, participants’ responses to the open-ended 
question clearly show that a great majority of those who favored the older child were 
keenly conscious of the difference in age-specific demands among offspring. This is, 
however, a proximate-level explanation of how parental resource allocation among 
different-aged children operates here and now: in allocating food among their children, 
human parents sensitively react to the cues of age-specific demands. In order to answer 
why such a parental motivation system has come into existence to control parental 
behavior and why other possible motivation systems (such as a motive of strict equity) 
have not evolved, we need an ultimate-level explanation that maps the functional 
organization of the evolved psychological mechanisms for allocating resources among 
children onto the statistically recurrent adaptive problems parents historically have 
faced in maximizing their inclusive fitness.                    
Here I attempt to map the information-processing architecture of parental resource 
allocation system. The psychological adaptation was designed to solve the recurrent 
adaptive problem that how a parent should optimally allocate resources among its 
different-aged children. Jeon (chapter 2) showed that the parental solution (i.e., parental 
ESS strategy) is to allocate resources such that the marginal benefits to each offspring, 
weighted by the survival probability to the adult age; therefore, the function (or 
‘purpose’) of the psychological mechanism for allocating parental resources is to 
implement the ESS allocation strategy in parental caregiving. It is never implied that 
parents are aware of the ‘purpose’. Rather, just as people are very good at detecting 
cheaters in social exchange as if they were playing “tit for tat” strategy in iterated 
prisoner’s dilemma game (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992), 
human parents are expected to allocate resources among their children in a particular 
way as if they were deliberately playing the ESS allocation strategy found in Jeon’s 
(chapter 2) model.  
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Figure 3.3 illustrates a tentative scheme for the design of parental resources 
allocation system among different-aged children. Although other important attributes of 
children, such as sex, health, size, and genetic relatedness, will obviously influence 
parental allocation decision rule, they are beyond the scope of this study and hence their 
effects are presumed to be held constant. The parental psychological mechanism for 
allocating resources among children may be activated by specific forms of input, which 
may include 1) the respective ages of children, 2) the specific shape of offspring’s 
survival curve with regard to a particular type of resources, and 3) the total amount of 
resources that can be provided to the children at a fitness cost to the parent herself. 
Under the fairly general assumption that offspring survival probability will linearly 
increase with the amount of resources provided or non-linearly increase exhibiting 
diminishing returns, Jeon’s (chapter 2) model determined the decision rule of the system 
(i.e., the ESS allocation strategy of the parents). The decision rule that processes inputs 
taken into the system may produce different outputs according to the nature of particular 
inputs. For instance, if the resource to be allocated is food, then the impact of a small 
unit of food to offspring will be higher for the younger offspring before the onset of 
food provisioning (i.e., the younger is ‘needier’). In such cases, the parental allocation 
decision rule will produce the outcome that allocates more resources to the older 
offspring (see Fig. 3). Note that different outputs are possible if different inputs are 
taken into the psychological mechanism: for example, 1) children may be of the same 
age (input 1), 2) the type of resources to be allocated may be substantially different 
from tangible resources like food (input 2, see previous discussion of the result of time 
allocation), and 3) the amount of available resources may not be sufficient (input 3). In 
sum, it is suggested that the scheme illustrated in Figure 3.3 may well capture the 
functional architecture of psychological adaptations dealing with how to allocate 
resources among different-aged children. 
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Input Decision rule Output
Respective ages of the children
The amount of resources available
How child survival will increase with 




to each child ×
survival prob. to 
the adult age]
are equalized for all 
children
In case of tangible 
resources like food, 
give more to older 
children
 
Figure 3.3. A suggested scheme for the functional organization of parental resources 
allocation system among different-aged children. 
 
Conclusions 
Inspired by the fact that the competing evolutionary hypotheses of parental 
investment allocation among different-aged children make distinct predictions about the 
allocation pattern at a given point in time, this study attempted to discern which 
hypothesis successfully predicts participants’ responses. The results unequivocally 
supported Jeon’s (chapter 2) game-theoretic model of parental favoritism, which may 
contribute to fully characterizing the information-processing architecture of 
discriminative parental psychological mechanisms.      
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Chapter 4: The Battleground of Intrafamilial Conflict between the 
Parent, Senior Offspring, and Junior Offspring 
 
SUMMARY  
Trivers (1974) first pointed out that family members may be in conflict over the 
amount of parental investment (PI): each individual offspring favors a preferential 
investment of PI toward itself whereas parents favor an equal allocation across all 
offspring. Existing models of intrafamilial conflict tend to separately analyze parent-
offspring conflict and sibling competition and do not allow family members to differ in 
their age. Using an inclusive fitness approach for class-structured populations, I 
investigate the optimal allocation of PI from the viewpoint of each offspring, and then 
synthesize the battleground of intrafamilial conflicts between a parent and its multiple 
offspring of differing ages. If age spacing between siblings is close enough, each 
offspring favors preferential investment toward itself. Remarkably, if age spacing is 
distant enough, the junior sibling favors preferential investment of PI toward its senior 
sibling. Yet the potential for family conflicts is somewhat constantly maintained, 
because the senior sibling favors far more biased allocation than the junior sibling 
allows. The results imply that the classic picture of Trivers’ (1974) intrafamilial conflict 
may need to be substantially revised. The current model may provide a useful 
theoretical framework for inferring the adaptive design of sibling relationships and 




In his seminal paper, Trivers (1974) pointed out that parents and offspring are in 
conflict over the amount of parent investment (PI). Whereas a parent is equally related 
to all its progeny, a focal offspring is related to itself twice as much as its full siblings. 
Thus an offspring is selected to demand more resources than its parent is willing to 
give. Despite earlier criticisms (Alexander, 1974), the theory of parent-offspring 
conflict has become one of the key concepts in evolutionary biology and stimulated 
numerous theoretical and empirical studies of family relations (reviewed in Godfray, 
1995a; Mock & Parker, 1997; Parker, Royle, & Hartley, 2002b). Today it is recognized 
that theoretical models of intrafamilial conflict are classified into two broad categories: 
1) battleground models that explore the magnitude of potential genetic conflict by 
identifying the difference between the optimal distribution of PI for each family 
member; and 2) resolution models that seek to predict how the potential conflict is 
actually resolved among family members (Godfray, 1995a, 1999).  
Initial models of intrafamilial conflict focused on the case of a single parent 
investing into a single offspring (e.g., Godfray, 1991; Macnair & Parker, 1978; Parker 
& Macnair, 1978). They were rather unrealistic, given that most birds and mammals 
with extensive parental care produce multiple offspring in litters or clutches. Extending 
the simple model, however, makes it much more difficult to analyze the intrafamilial 
strife: the actual pattern of PI observed in nature will then be determined by sibling 
conflict as well as parent-offspring conflict (for simplicity, this paper will not consider 
the role of sexual conflict between the male and female parents) (Godfray & Johnstone, 
2000; Parker et al., 2002b). Many models of PI distribution in larger broods make the 
simplifying assumption that the total amount of PI delivered to the brood is fixed; thus 
sibling competition is assumed to influence only the division of PI among offspring, 
who may differ in their competitive abilities or cryptic internal conditions (i.e., “needs”) 
(Godfray, 1995b; Parker et al., 1989; Parker et al., 2002a). Clearly, the assumption is 
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dubious that increased demand by one offspring only reduces the amount of PI available 
for the other offspring, but does not affect at all parents’ future survival and 
reproduction. Models allowing the total amount of PI to evolve as well typically give 
parents full control over the total PI amount and thus pay little attention to identifying 
the ideal distribution of PI from the viewpoint of each individual offspring (Johnstone, 
2004; Rodriguez-Girones, 1999; Rodriguez-Girones, Enquist, & Lachmann, 2001).  
Offspring within a brood may differ not only in their competitive abilities or 
cryptic conditions but in some fundamental attributes such as age and sex. In 
asynchronously hatching birds and most mammals, it is well known that age differences 
among siblings greatly influence the pattern of food allocation among siblings, resulting 
in the higher mortality of younger siblings (It is important to note that age discrepancy 
among siblings should be distinguished from competitive asymmetries. For one, the age 
differences at earlier ages bring about a number of physiological and developmental 
changes, not all of which are translated into competitive asymmetries) (Glassey & 
Forbes, 2002; Magrath, 1990). Despite the marked effect of age differences among 
offspring on the allocation of PI within the family, it has yet to be analyzed how 
intrafamilial conflict among a parent and its multiple offspring of differing ages takes 
place.  
Consider the simplistic case of a single parent looking after its two offspring of 
differing ages. The parent will have its own view of how much PI to deliver and how to 
divide the PI among the two offspring. Meanwhile, each offspring will also have its 
own view of how much resource the parent should invest in its sibling, as well as in it 
(see Figure 4.1). According to Trivers’ (1974) classical theory of parent-offspring 
conflict, each offspring will obviously want more resources for itself than the parent 
wants to give. But how much PI would each offspring ‘want’ the parent to invest in its 
sibling? Verbal reasoning based on only genetic relatedness does not seem to help much 
here, because in most cases a focal offspring will be equally related to both its sibling 
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and the parent. Given that the parent is close to death and may need to increase its 
reproductive effort anyhow, a focal offspring may want the parent to invest a lot in its 
sibling. However, given that the two young are fiercely competing for limited parental 
resources, a focal offspring may want the parent to invest little in its sibling. Hence the 
question seems insurmountable. At the very least, since a focal offspring is twice as 
closely related to itself as to its sibling, it could be safely argued that a focal offspring 
would “want his mother to invest in him more than in any particular brother or sister” 
(Dawkins, 1976, p. 128). As we shall see later, even this fairly straightforward argument 























Figure 4.1. A diagram for intrafamilial conflict over the allocation of parental resources 
among two offspring of differing ages. Each family member (a parent, the 
senior sibling, and the junior sibling) has different evolutionary interests 
concerning the amount of parental resources that each of the two offspring 
should obtain. Here * jsx )( indicates, for example, the optimal resource share 
of the senior offspring from the perspective of the junior offspring. 
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Also, * psx )(  indicates the optimal resource share of the senior from the 
perspective of the parent.  
 
In order to construct a battleground model for intrafamilial conflict among a 
parent and its different-aged offspring, we should take into account two counteracting 
effects of offspring growth on the allocation of PI. Take, for example, the perspective of 
the parent. It might pay the parent to bias its resources toward its senior offspring, 
because senior offspring have higher reproductive value, i.e., greater genetic 
contribution far into the future generation (Fisher, 1930). However, it might also pay the 
parent to bias its resources toward junior offspring, because they could benefit more 
from additional resources than their senior offspring, in terms of increased survival 
probability (Clutton-Brock, 1991; Rubenstein, 1982; Sargent & Gross, 1986). The same 
dilemma can be said for the perspective of each offspring, which complicates the 
mapping of intrafamilial conflict. 
In this paper, I investigate the conflict battleground among a parent and its 
offspring of differing ages. Using an inclusive fitness approach (Taylor, 1990, 1996), I 
develop kin selection models of class-structured populations in which individuals fall 
into different age classes. The optimal allocation of PI among different-aged offspring 
from the perspective of the parent was explored elsewhere (chapter 2). Here I identify 
the optimal allocation of PI from the perspective of each different-aged offspring and 
then construct the battleground of intrafamilial conflict when offspring differ in their 
ages. The model shows that a focal offspring’s ideal resource shares from the 
perspective of each family member (the parent, the focal offspring itself, and the 
siblings) never coincide, which implies a wide variety of family conflicts even in a 
simplistic family system. Surprisingly, contrary to Dawkins’ (1976) expectations, a 
focal offspring may ‘want’ the parent to invest less resource in it than in its sibling(s) 
under certain circumstances.  
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THE MODEL 
Population structure and life history 
Consider a hermaphroditic population that is structured into n +1 age classes, that 
is, a parental class (class P) and n offspring classes (class Oi: i = 1,…, n). The 
population is also subdivided into distinct broods: each parent provisions only their own 
offspring within its brood. After mating with another adult, a single parent produces 2f 
newborn offspring per each time step. The parent actually expects fitness credit for f 
offspring since one-half of the newborn offspring are credited to its mate.  
The time step in this system corresponds to the average age gap between siblings; 
it will be measured in days for asynchronously hatching birds and in months or years for 
mammals (The model thus focuses on within-year dynamics for the case of birds). For 
simplicity, I do not take into account the dynamic (i.e., time-dependent) aspects of 
parent-offspring interactions. Instead I assume that, for each time step, the parent-
offspring interaction is composed of a series of feeding events and that the outcome of 
each event has an independent effect on the genetic success of an allocation strategy.  
During each time step, a parent distributes its limited resources among its 
different-aged offspring at a cost of the parent’s residual survival. Since there may be a 
multiple number of offspring within the same age class, we denote by ui the average 
number of age-i offspring per each adult. Let xi be the amount of PI that a single age-i 
offspring receives by its parent. Therefore, the total amount of PI that a parent invests in 
its current entire offspring per time step is denoted as Ex =∑i uixi. The parent’s allocation 
pattern among its offspring of n age classes is described by a vector x = [x1, x2,…, xn], 
where each trait value xi is determined by distinct genes and the n traits are genetically 
uncorrelated with each other. It takes n time steps for a newborn offspring of age-1 to 
survive and grows into a reproducing adult: an age-i offspring survives into the next 
time step with survival probability φi = φi(xi), an increasing function of the amount of PI 
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it receives from the parent. The parent survives to the next time step with probability ψ 
= ψ(Ex), a decreasing function of Ex. 
To determine the conflict battleground within the family, the model developed 
here seeks the optimal allocation of PI from the viewpoint of offspring in a certain age 
class (the optimal allocation from the viewpoint of the parent was given in chapter 2). I 
assume that offspring in age-k (k = 1,…, n) class have complete control over both how 
much PI in total should be delivered and how the PI should be divided among the 
different-aged offspring. That is, the allocation strategy x is solely determined by the 
genes expressed within the body of age-k offspring. The dynamics of the resident 
population is given by n(t +1) = An(t), where n(t) = [n1, n2,…, nn, np] indicates the 
number of offspring in age classes from 1 to n and that of parents at time t. The 
population transition matrix A is  












































.           (4.1) 
The matrix A in the ‘normal’ resident population (i.e., harboring no mutant 
strategy) will eventually reach at demographic equilibrium. Let us denote the normal 
matrix at equilibrium by A*. Assuming zero population growth, the dominant 
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pv ] is the dominant left eigenvector of A*(see Supplemental data 1). 
Since u* and v* can be scaled at will, I choose the abundance of parental class ∗pu to 




Inclusive fitness approach 
The inclusive fitness approach focuses on a random actor and adds up the effects 
of its deviant act on the fitness of all recipients; thus it estimates the fitness of a rare, 
mutant strategy in a normal population (Hamilton, 1964; Taylor, 1990, 1996; Taylor, 
Wild, & Gardner, 2006). The so-called ‘inclusive fitness effect’, i.e., the difference 
between the mutant fitness and normal fitness, tells us whether the mutant strategy will 
be selected or eliminated in the population.  
To determine the optimal allocation of PI from the viewpoint of offspring of a 
certain age, I fasten attention to a focal age-k mutant offspring (the ‘actor’) using a 






ix = xi + ∆x) in the resident 
population dominated by the normal strategy x. The mutant strategy is assumed to be 
rare enough that the number of age-i offspring per adult is still given by *iu . The 
recipients of the focal juvenile actor’s allocation behavior will belong to different age 
classes: the age-k actor itself, the actor’s different-age siblings, and the parent. First, the 
focal age-k juvenile actor with the mutant strategy x° will ‘take’ okx  resources from the 
parent. Second, we should calculate the amount of PI that the actor’s different-age 
sibling should receive, which is rather complicated to obtain. If the brood containing the 
focal juvenile actor has a multiple number of age-k offspring (the number is *ku , 
including the focal actor), then each of the actor’s different-age siblings should get the 
average amount of PI allocated by both the focal age-k mutant actor and the ( *ku −1) 
individuals of normal age-k offspring. Consequently, the average amount of PI that a 





ku . If 
*
ku  is equal to or less than 1, then 
*
ku  can be interpreted as the 
probability that the brood will actually contain the focal age-k mutant actor. In this case, 
a single age-i offspring will get oix  resources if the brood actually has the focal 
juvenile actor with probability of *ku ; it will get ix  resources if the brood does not 




k xu + 
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(1− *ku )xi when 
*
ku ≤ 1. Finally, the total amount of PI that the focal mutant actor’s 
parent invests in its current brood is denoted as xE =∑i i
*
i xu . The transition matrix of 
the mutant subpopulation within the resident population is given by 











































.           (4.2) 
Let us now identify the fitness of recipients who may belong to different age 
classes. The fitness of a random individual in a certain class can be given by the sum of 
its fitness contribution into the next time step, each weighted by the individual class 
reproductive value (Taylor, 1990; Taylor et al., 2006). Accordingly, the recipient fitness 
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where vn+1 is equal to vp for k = n (Supplemental data 4.1). The recipient fitness of an 
age-i (i ≠ k) offspring (the actor’s different-age sibling) is: 
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ku )xi for 
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ku ≤ 
1. The recipient fitness of the focal actor’s parent is: 
)(...)( 
i
211 ∑+=+= ∗∗∗ i*inxpp xufEvfvw ψϕϕϕψ            (4.5) 
The inclusive fitness effect ∆W of the focal age-k actor’s deviant allocation 
strategy x° is calculated by the sum of the effects of the deviant strategy on the fitness 
of all recipients, each weighted by the actor’s relatedness to the individual recipient. Let 
rki be the coefficient of relatedness between the age-k juvenile actor and its age-i sibling; 
let rkp the relatedness between the age-k actor and its parent. For the focal actor’s 
deviant allocation strategy, one recipient exists in the age-k class (the actor itself), *iu  
recipients exist in the age-i (i ≠ k) class, and one parent exists in the parental class. The 
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equilibrium allocation strategy x* of a focal age-k juvenile actor is thus determined by 
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where 0 is a vector of zeros. From equation 4.6 and Supplemental data 4.1, the 
following n equilibrium conditions for are derived: 
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                                                                   (4.8) 
Equation 4.8 shows that an age-k offspring will be selected to allocate PI such that 
the marginal benefit of additional resources to its own survival )( *kk xϕ′ , weighted by its 
survival probability to the reproducing age )...( 1
∗∗
+ nk ϕϕ , is equal to the relatedness-
weighted marginal benefit to its different-age sibling’s survival )( *iiki xr ϕ′ , weighted by 
the sibling’s survival probability to the reproducing age )...( ∗∗ ni ϕϕ . Moreover, these 
properly weighted marginal benefits should be balanced by the relatedness-weighted 
marginal cost of current total investment to the parent’s residual survival )( *xkp Er ψ ′ . 
Readers may notice that equation 4.8 is a marginal version of Hamilton’s (1964) rule, in 
which the marginal fitness effects of the focal age-k actor’s allocation behavior via 
direct and indirect routes are scaled by the corresponding coefficient of relatedness 
(Frank, 1998, 2006).  
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It should be checked whether the equilibrium allocation strategy x*= [ *x1 ,
*x2 ,…, 
*
nx ] of a focal offspring represents a set of evolutionary attractors that would persist 
over evolutionary time. This dynamical concept of stability is referred to as 
‘dynamically stable strategy (DSS)’ (Wild & Taylor, 2004), which accords with the 
stability theory of dynamical systems (Leimar, in press). The DSS condition is 
considered in Supplemental data 4.2. 
Thus far, we have concentrated on the optimal allocation of PI from each 
offspring’s perspective. In order to avoid the confusion caused by the fact that the ideal 
resource share of a focal offspring may be different according to each family member’s 
perspectives, I hereafter denote by * jix )(  the ideal resource share of an age-i offspring 
from the perspective of an age-j offspring. Similarly, * pix )(  is denoted as the ideal 
resource share of an age-i offspring from the parent’s perspective. The optimal 
allocation of PI from the parent’s perspective is given by the following equilibrium 
conditions (chapter 2): 







ppnpp Ex...xx ψϕϕϕϕϕϕϕϕ . (4.9) 
Equation 4.9 means that the parent is selected to allocate PI such that the marginal 
benefit of additional resources to each offspring’s survival )( )(
*
pii xϕ′ , weighted by the 
offspring’s survival probability to the reproducing age )...( )()(1
∗∗
+ pnpi ϕϕ , is all equal to the 
marginal cost of current total expenditure to the parent’s residual survival )( )(
*
pxEψ ′ . 
Being obtained by the standard ESS modeling technique, equation 4.9 lacks the 
relatedness terms between the parental actor and each offspring recipient. To be 









ppnppp Exr...xrxr ψϕϕϕϕϕϕϕϕ , 
(4.10) 
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where rpi the coefficient of relatedness between the parental actor and the age-i 
offspring recipient. I hereafter assume that rp1 = … = rpn = rp. Note that equations 4.9 
and 4.10 give qualitatively same results on the parental optimal strategy.  
 
RESULTS 
How much resource should my sibling receive from our parent? 
In this section I derive concrete predictions on the optimal allocation of PI from a 
focal offspring’s perspective. Following previous research, I assume that the impact of 
additional resources on younger offspring’s survival is higher than that on older 
offspring’s survival (Clutton-Brock, 1991; Rubenstein, 1982; Sargent & Gross, 1986; 
West-Eberhard, 1975). There may be two general situations that we should further 
consider: (1) a younger offspring may yield higher marginal returns for every level of 
resources that was already provided during a feeding episode, or 2) a younger offspring 
may yield higher marginal returns only when the resources already provided are none or 
few (i.e., only when both are equally hungry); if the resources provided are relatively 
high (i.e., when both were equally fed well), the marginal gain of extra resources would 
be higher for the older offspring. It was checked that both situations make qualitatively 
the same predictions. Therefore this chapter presents only the results under the second 
situation, which may be more plausible (for detailed explanation, see chapter 2). As 
before, it is assumed that a focal offspring completely controls both the total amount of 
PI that is delivered by the parent and how to allocate the PI among itself and other 
siblings.    
What amount of PI would a focal age-k offspring ‘allocate’ to its siblings, as well 
as to itself? Recall that the survival probability of an offspring is expected to increase 
with the resources provided, with diminishing returns (i.e., ϕ΄(x) > 0, ϕ˝(x) < 0) (e.g., 
Smith & Fretwell, 1974). Consider the focal age-k offspring and its younger sibling 
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aged k −1. At evolutionary equilibrium, each sibling will receive the optimal level of 
resources ( ∗ )(kkx  and
∗
− )(1 kkx , where k = 2,…, n) from the parent (optimal in the sense that 
the focal age-k sibling’s inclusive fitness is maximized by the specific allocation 
pattern). Since ϕ΄(x) decreases with x, whether ∗ )(kkx  is larger or smaller than 
∗
− )(1 kkx can be determined by comparing the younger sibling’s marginal return at being 
given ∗− )(1 kkx  with its marginal return at being given 
∗
)(kkx . For instance, if 
)( )(11
∗
−−′ kkk xϕ  is larger than )( )(1
∗
−′ kkk xϕ , then 
∗
− )(1 kkx  will be less than 
∗
)(kkx . Meanwhile, 
equation 4.8 implies the following equation: 
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where rk,k-1 is the coefficient of relatedness between the focal age-k actor and its age-(k 















































ϕϕ .   (4.12) 
The rightmost term in equation 4.12 is always positive; thus, ∗− )(1 kkx  turns out to be less 
than ∗ )k(kx . From a focal offspring’s perspective, the optimal resource share that its 
younger sibling should get from the parent is less than the optimal resource share that 
the focal offspring itself should get. In sum, an elder sibling thus will always want its 
parent to invest more in itself than in its younger sibling.      
Let us now consider a focal age-k offspring and its elder sibling aged k +1. As in 
the previous paragraph, each offspring will get the optimal level of resources, ∗ )k(kx  
and ∗+ )k(kx 1 (k = 1,…, n−1) at evolutionary equilibrium. Whether 
∗
)k(kx  is larger or 
smaller than ∗+ )k(kx 1 can be determined by comparing the focal offspring’s marginal 
return at ∗ )k(kx  with its marginal return at 
∗




∗ ′−′ )k(kk)k(kk xx ϕϕ ] tells us whether 
∗
)k(kx  is larger or smaller than 
∗
+ )k(kx 1 . From 
equation 4.8, it can be derived that 




++ ′=′ )k(kkk,k)k(kk)k(kk xrxx ϕϕϕ ,               (4.13) 
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where rk,k+1 is the coefficient of relatedness between the focal age-k actor and its age-(k 





















































∗ ′−′ )k(kk)k(kk xx ϕϕ ] can be positive, negative, or zero, i.e., 
∗
)k(kx  can be smaller or 
larger than, or equal to, ∗+ )k(kx 1 . Therefore, from a focal offspring’s perspective, the 
optimal resource share that the offspring itself should get from the parent may be larger 
or smaller than, or equal to, the optimal resource share that its elder sibling should get. 
Surprisingly, this implies that a younger focal offspring sometimes may ‘want’ its 
parent to invest less in itself than in its elder sibling, although the focal offspring is 
twice as closely related to itself. 
To illustrate the above results, I temporarily assume explicit functions for an age-i 
offspring survival: 
                 ϕi (xi) = K[1 − exp(−ci xi))],                      (4.15) 
where the shape constant ci is allowed to vary according to an offspring’s distinct age. It 
was assumed that a younger offspring would yield higher marginal returns only when 
the resources already provided are none or few. If both offspring are equally fed well, 
then it would be the older offspring that yields higher marginal returns with additional 
resources. In order to ensure such a relationship, ci is assumed to be larger than ci+1. In 
other words, the shape constant ci of an age-i offspring survival curve will be inversely 
related to the offspring’s age: c1 > c2 > … > cn (Fig. 4. 2) (Sargent & Gross, 1986; 
Clutton-Brock, 1991). Meanwhile, a parent’s residual survival probability is given by an 
exponentially decreasing function of current parental expenditure (i.e., each increment 
of parental investment is more costly than the previous increment): 







),           (4.16)  
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where a and b are positive parameters that specify how the total amount of resources 






















) Younger offspring (ϕ1)
Older offspring (ϕ2)
 
Figure 4.2. The survival probabilities of each offspring (ϕ(x)) as a function of the 
resources provided (x) during a single feeding episode. With a low value of 
x, the slope of the tangent line to a survival curve at the point (x,ϕ(x)), i.e., 
∂ϕ(x)/∂x, is higher for the younger offspring’s curve ϕ1 than the older 
offspring’s curve ϕ2; when x is relatively high, the slope of the tangent line 
is higher for the older offspring’s curve ϕ2. Parameters are K = 0.9, c1 = 6, 
and c2 = 2.  
 
Figure 4.3a shows the optimal allocation of PI among two different-aged offspring 
from the perspective of the senior sibling. The graph was plotted across a range of the 
senior sibling’s shape constant c2 with the junior sibling’s constant c1 being fixed. 
Given that the shape constant would be inversely related to offspring age, the decrease 
of c2 may correspond to the increase of the senior’s age with the junior’s age being 
fixed. As expected, it turns out that the senior sibling always ‘wants’ its parent to invest 
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more in itself than its junior sibling (Fig. 4.3a). Moreover, the degree of favoring the 
senior itself increases as the age spacing between the two siblings increases. Figure 4.3b 
reveals the optimal allocation of PI from the junior sibling. When the age spacing is 
close enough, the junior sibling ‘wants’ its parent to invest more in itself than its senior 
sibling. As the age spacing increases, however, the trend becomes reversed: under a 
sufficiently large age gap, the junior sibling will ‘want’ its parent to invest less in itself 
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Figure 4.3. The optimal allocation of PI from the viewpoint of each sibling, when the 
senior sibling’s shape constant c2 is varied from 6 to 2 with the junior 
sibling’s constant c1 being fixed at 6. As the shape constant will be 
inversely associated with offspring age, this could be understood as 
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increasing the senior’s age only with the junior’s age being fixed. (a) The 
optimal allocation of PI from the viewpoint of the senior sibling. The 
equilibrium values were obtained from a variation of equation (8): 
)()()()( )2(2(2)22(2)11(2)2221
∗′−=′=′ xp
*** Erxxxr ψϕϕϕ , where ∗ )2(xE = +
*fx (2)1  
** xxf (2)2)2(11 )(ϕ . (b) The optimal allocation of PI from the viewpoint of the 
junior sibling. The equilibrium values were obtained from 
)()()()( (1)1(1)2212(1)11(1)22
∗′−=′=′ xp
*** Erxrxx ψϕϕϕ , where ∗ )1(xE = +
*fx (1)1  
** xxf (1)2)1(11 )(ϕ . Parameters used are K = 0.9, f = 1.2, a = 0.1, b =1, and r1p = 
r12 = r2p = 0.5.  
 
The battleground of conflicts among family members 
Having seen that each family member has different optima for how parental 
resources should be allocated among offspring, I now attempt to define over what 
parameter space potential genetic conflict can occur (i.e., to define the ‘battleground’ of 
family conflicts). To simplify the matter, I focus on the case of a single parent looking 
after its two offspring of differing ages. 
First, how would family conflicts take place over the amount of resources that 
should be delivered to an age-1 junior sibling? It is intuitively obvious that the junior’s 
resource share insisted on by the junior itself *x (1)1  would be larger than either the 
junior’s share insisted on by the parent * px )(1  or the junior’s share insisted on by the 
age-2 senior sibling *x (2)1 . Indeed, this can be easily proved and hence its proof shall be 
omitted. How will the parent and the senior be in conflict over the amount of resources 
to be delivered to the junior? In order for * px )(1  to be less than 
*x (2)1 , i.e., for the 
junior’s optimal share from the parental perspective to be less than the junior’s optimal 
share from the senior’s perspective, )( )(11
*
pxϕ′  should be larger than )( )2(11
*xϕ′ . Based on 
equations (8) and (10), the condition for * px )(1 <


































.                (4.17) 
It can be easily seen that inequality 4.17 is likely to hold, particularly if the sibling 
pairs are full siblings. For full-siblings, both the senior’s genetic relatedness to the 
junior r21 and the senior’s relatedness to the parent r2p are 0.5 and hence r21/ r2p can be 
ignored in inequality (20). Since )()/( (2))(




* xx ϕϕ  is always larger than unity, the left-hand side of inequality 4.17 will 
be larger than 0.5 under nearly all circumstances. In short, for full siblings, the junior’s 
optimal resource share insisted on by the parent * px )(1 will be less than the junior’s share 
insisted on by the senior *x (2)1 , unless the marginal cost of current total investment to 
the parental residual survival drops too abruptly (Interestingly, for half-siblings, 
inequality 4.17 becomes [ )()/( (2))(
∗∗ ′′ xpx EE ψψ ][ )()/( )(22)2(22
*
p
* xx ϕϕ ] > 1, which is more 
difficult to be met. In the case of half-siblings, therefore, it is very likely that the senior 
sibling, not the parent, would insist on the least amount of resources for the share of the 
junior sibling).  
Next, how do family members disagree about the amount of resources that should 
be delivered to the age-2 senior sibling? Obviously, the senior’s resource share insisted 
on by the senior itself *x (2)2  would be larger than either the senior’s share insisted on by 
the parent * px )(2  or the senior’s share insisted on by the age-1 junior 
*x (1)2  (proofs shall 
not be shown). Again, the necessary and sufficient condition for * px )(2 <





















.                       (4.18) 
For full-siblings, r12/ r1p can be ignored and thus whether inequality 4.18 holds or not 
depends on the value of )()/( (1))(
∗∗ ′′ xpx EE ψψ , which will be slightly less than unity. 
Consequently, for full siblings, the senior’s optimal resource from the parental 
perspective * px )(2 will be less than the senior’s share from the junior’s perspective 
*x (1)2 , 
unless the marginal cost of current total investment to the parental residual survival 
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declines too abruptly. By contrast, for a single parent looking after two half-siblings, it 
is always the junior sibling who insists on the least amount of resources for the share of 
the senior sibling. 
Figure 4.4 shows the battleground of three-way family conflicts between a parent, 
its senior offspring, and junior offspring over the optimal allocation of parental 
resources, for the case of full-siblings. As to the senior sibling’s ‘fair’ share, for 
example, all family members agree that the senior should receive parental resources to 
some extent (see fig 4.4a). However, unless the marginal cost of total investment to the 
parent’s residual survival declines too rapidly, it is the parent who wants to allocate the 
least amount of resources for the senior sibling. Hence conflict ensues between the 
parent and its two siblings: in this zone of conflict, increasing the amount of resources 
for the senior sibling is advantageous to both siblings but harmful to the parent. A 
different form of family conflict is also possible, because it is the senior sibling itself 
who insists on the greatest amount of resources for the senior. In the zone of conflict 
between the senior sibling versus others (the parent and the junior sibling), increasing 
the resource level for the senior is advantageous to the senior but disadvantageous to 
both the parent and the junior sibling. Above the level of optimal PI from the senior’s 
own perspective, no family member wants to increase the resource level and hence no 
conflict occurs (fig 4.4a). It is worth noting that, as the age spacing between two 
siblings increases, all family members insist that the ideal share of PI for the senior 
sibling should increase. Figure 4.4b illustrates the family conflict over the optimal PI for 
the junior sibling, which shows qualitatively the same pattern as Figure 4.4a. In general, 
among family members, it is the focal offspring itself who insists on the greatest amount 
of resources for the focal offspring. In most cases (especially for full-siblings), the 
parent insists on the least for the focal offspring and the focal offspring’s sibling insists 
on the intermediate. Figure 4.4b also indicates that, as the age gap increases, the ideal 
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Figure 4.4. The battleground of three-way family conflicts between a parent, its senior 
offspring, and its junior offspring over the optimal allocation of parental 
resources. (a) the disagreement over the optimal amount of resources for 
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the senior sibling. (b) the disagreement over the optimal amount of 




Figure 4.5a shows the evolutionary conflicts over the total amount of PI that 
should be delivered for a current feeding episode. Unsurprisingly, the total amount of PI 
that serves the interests of either sibling is higher than the total PI serving the parental 
interests (fig 4.5a). As the senior sibling’s age increases with the junior sibling’s age 
being fixed, each family member insists that the total amount of PI should increase. In 
order to see how family members disagree about the division of PI among different-
aged offspring as well as the total amount of PI to be delivered, the optimal resource 
bias toward the senior offspring, measured as *x2 /(
** xx 21 + ), was plotted for each family 
member’s viewpoint (fig 4.5b). It is revealed that the optimal bias of PI toward the 
senior sibling is highest for the senior itself, followed by the parent, and the junior 
sibling. All family members agree that, the larger the age spacing between two siblings, 
the more resource the senior should get. Importantly, figure 4.5b shows that the 
disagreement over how to divide PI among two siblings remains relatively constant over 
the range of age spacing: the lines of optimal bias do not converge across the shape 
constant of the senior sibling. This indicates that the genetic potential for intrafamilial 
conflicts is maintained irrespective of the age spacing between siblings. Nevertheless, 
there may be an interesting implication resulting from the age spacing. When age gap is 
close, the junior offspring wants to get more than its senior sibling; however, when age 
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Figure 4.5. Evolutionary conflicts of interests over (a) the total amount of PI that should 
be delivered for a current feeding episode and (b) the optimal resource bias 
toward the senior sibling. The bias was measured as *x2 /(
** xx 21 + ). Note 
that the bias toward the senior from the perspective of the junior sibling is 
below 0.5 if the age spacing is close enough, i.e., the junior wants to get 
more resources in such situations. The bias toward the senior exceeds as 
the age spacing increases. The same parameters were used. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The results described above indicate that, if family members were allowed to 
differ in their ages, the classic picture of Trivers’ (1974) parent-offspring conflict 
should be fundamentally revised. Taking into account the role of age-specific 
reproductive value, one can no longer expect that each individual offspring should favor 
a preferential investment of PI toward itself whereas parents should prefer an equal 
allocation of PI across all offspring. The results of this chapter are summarized as 
follows: 
1. A senior sibling wants the parent to invest more in itself than in its younger 
sibling. 
2. If age spacing is close enough, a junior sibling wants the parent to invest more 
in itself than in its senior. However, if the age spacing is large enough, a junior sibling 
wants the parent to invest less in itself than its senior. 
3. In most situations composed of full siblings, each family member (a parent, its 
senior offspring, and junior offspring) will disagree over the optimal amount of 
resources for a focal offspring. The focal offspring insists on the largest amount of 
resources for itself, followed by its sibling, and by the parent the least.                 
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4. As the age gap between siblings increases, all family members increasingly 
favor biased allocation of PI toward the senior sibling. Yet each family member 
continues to disagree over how strongly the senior sibling should be favored; hence the 
potential of intrafamilial conflict is maintained irrespective of age spacing.  
 
Previous models of intrafamilial conflict have not explored how the optimal 
allocation of PI from the viewpoint of each individual offspring would be shaped 
according to the age composition of the brood. Indeed, the two counteracting effects of 
offspring growth on PI allocation − the elder sibling has a higher reproductive value and 
yet the junior sibling benefits more from a unit of extra resources − has hindered the full 
analysis of sibling competition over parental resources. For instance, Dawkins (1976, p. 
128) argued that a senior sibling may at times favor biased allocation of foods toward its 
junior sibling because of the junior’s higher needs for foods. By contrast, the formal 
model presented here demonstrates that a senior sibling will always want biased 
allocation toward itself despite (in fact, because of) its junior sibling’s higher needs for 
foods. Equation (4.8), a marginal version of Hamilton’s rule that correctly weighted 
each family member’s fitness change by its age-specific reproductive value, produces 
those results if the junior sibling could benefit more from a unit of additional resources 
than the senior.                  
Contrary to Trivers’ (1974) insight that each individual offspring should strive to 
get more resources for itself because each one is doubly related to itself, the current 
model reveals that a junior sibling will want less resources for itself than its senior 
sibling if the age spacing between them is sufficiently wide. The biased allocation in 
favor of senior siblings, a widespread phenomenon reported in almost all 
asynchronously hatching birds and mammals (Mock & Parker, 1997), hence does not 
necessarily imply that the junior siblings ‘lose’ the conflict with senior siblings or 
parents. Although a junior sibling may want less resources than its senior if the age 
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spacing is wide, this should not be taken to mean that the potential for genetic conflict 
between family members is diminished with the increment of age spacing. Rather, the 
potential for intrafamilial conflict is almost constantly maintained without regard to age 
spacing (see fig 4.5b). The reason is that the degree of favoring the senior from the 
perspective of either the senior itself or the parent continues to be higher than the degree 
of favoring the senior from the perspective of the junior.  
Therefore, if we measure the potential for intrafamilial conflict as the magnitude 
of PI range over which the evolutionary interests of family members are in conflict 
(Godfray, 1995a; Trivers, 1974), it can be said that age differences between siblings has 
little influence on aggravating or reducing conflicts within the family. This may have a 
profound implication on the hypothesis that hatching asynchrony and its consequent age 
asymmetries among siblings may have evolved as parental adaptations to reduce sibling 
competition (Hahn, 1981; Mock & Ploger, 1987). Since the model presented here is a 
battleground model that identifies the different optima for a parent and its multiple 
offspring of differing ages, how age asymmetries among siblings affect the resolution of 
conflict should be explicitly modeled by future studies.        
As it applies to the human family, the model presented here may provide a useful 
theoretical framework for analyzing sibling relationships in childhood and early 
adolescence. For instance, in a preliminary study college students were asked to divide 
an amount of hypothetical pocket money between themselves and their actual siblings. 
It was found that they allocated more money for themselves if their counterparts are 
their junior siblings. Yet they allocated less money for themselves if their counterparts 
are their senior siblings provided that the age spacing is wide enough (J. Jeon, 
unpublished results).  
Moreover, it has been known that each child has its unique perception about the 
fairness of parental preferential treatment (Kowal & Kramer, 1997; Kowal, Kramer, 
Krull, & Crick, 2002; Kowal, Krull, & Kramer, 2004). The current model suggests that 
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a certain child’s subjective criteria for judging whether parental resources are ‘fairly’ 
distributed among itself and its siblings may be a manifestation of specifically designed 
psychological mechanisms, whose function is to achieve the optimal allocation of PI 
from the focal child’s perspective. Consequently, it would be interesting to investigate if 
specific patterns of PI allocation that are perceived as ‘fair’ by children are in good 
accord with the ideal allocation pattern of PI that must have maximized the children’s 
inclusive fitness in ancestral environments, as predicted by the model developed here.                 
In summary, this study explored how intrafamilial conflicts over the allocation of 
parental resources take place between a parent, its senior offspring, and its junior 
offspring. If age spacing between siblings is close enough, each individual offspring 
favors preferential investment toward itself rather than its siblings. If age spacing is 
distant enough, however, the junior sibling agrees that the senior should get more 
resources from the parent. Yet the potential for family conflicts does not weaken, 
because the senior sibling favors far more biased allocation than the junior sibling 
allows. The results suggest that the classic picture of Trivers’ (1974) parent-offspring 
conflict may be too simplistic and needs to be substantially revised.   
 
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA  
4.1. Reproductive values and stable age distribution 
Assuming that λ remains at 1 due to the density-dependent regulation, the vector 
of individual reproductive values v* = ][ 1
∗∗∗
pn v,v,...,v  in the resident population be 
determined up to a scalar constant from the recurrence equation v*A* = v*. Since the 
eigenvector v* can be scaled at will, I choose the reproductive value of parents ∗pv  to 
equal 1. Then the reproductive value of each offspring class is: 





kiv ϕ  (i = 1,…, n)                (4A.1) 
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Likewise, the vector of stable age distribution u* = ][ 1
∗∗∗
pn u,u,...,u  can be determined up 
to a constant from the recurrence equation u*A* = u*. By choosing the relative number 
of parental class ∗pu to 1, I obtain the relative number of each offspring class: 








ki fu ϕ  (i = 2,…, n)               (5A.2) 
and u1 is defined as f.  
 
 
4. 2. Dynamical stability 







WΔ ]. In order to check whether a focal offspring’s 
equilibrium strategy x*= [ *x1 ,
*x2 ,…, 
*
nx ] represents a set of attractors over evolutionary 
time, I employ the following evolutionary dynamic (Abrams, Matsuda, & Harada, 1993; 
Greenwood-Lee, Taylor, & Haig, 2001; Wild & Taylor, 2004):    

















































































,            (4A.3) 
where the constant 2
ix
σ is the additive genetic variance of trait xi, the constant ji xxσ (i ≠ j) 
is the additive genetic covariance between xi and xj, and the notation d/dt is 
differentiation with respect to evolutionary time. Since the elements of the allocation 
vector were assumed be genetically uncorrelated with each other, the off-diagonal 
elements of the covariance matrix in equation (5A.3) are all zero. For the equilibrium 














































































































J         (4A.4) 
should be negative definite at the equilibrium point [ *x1 ,
*x2 ,…, 
*
nx ] (Wild & Taylor, 
2004). In other words, zTJz should be negative for all nonzero vectors z when J is 
evaluated at equilibrium. Recall that an age-i offspring survival φi(xi) increases with the 
amount of resources provided, with diminishing returns: ∂2φi(xi)/∂xi 2 < 0. No genetic 
correlation was assumed among each different-aged offspring’s resource share: 
∂2φi(xi)/∂xi∂xj = 0 (i ≠ j). Moreover, the parent’s residual survival is a decreasing, 
concave-down function of current total expenditure: 22 )/( xx EE ∂∂ ψ < 0. Taking these into 
account, one can verify that zTJz is negative for all nonzero vectors z. 
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Chapter 5: Altruism towards cousins 
 
SUMMARY  
Recent research on kin investment shows a matrilateral bias as a function of 
paternity uncertainty. Kin investment, however, is a special case of kin altruism. It is 
thus hypothesized that psychological adaptations have evolved to regulate cousin-
directed altruism according to predictably variable levels of paternity uncertainty in 
different categories of cousins. I develop a formal mathematical model that predicts that 
individuals should be most willing to act altruistically toward their mother’s sister’s 
children and least willing to act altruistically toward their father’s brother’s children. 
Altruism toward father’s sister’s and mother’s brother’s children are predicted to fall in 
between. An empirical study (N = 195), assessing expressed altruistic proclivities, 
confirmed predictions from the model. Participants expressed willingness-to-help 
following this descending order, 1) mother’s sister’s children, 2) mother’s brother’s 
children, 3) father’s sister’s children, and 4) father’s brother’s children. The 
psychological variables of emotional closeness, empathic concern, and contact 
frequency showed precisely the same pattern across distinct cousins, providing 
convergent confirmation of the model. The results support the hypothesis of cousin-
specific adaptations sensitive to varying probabilities of paternity uncertainty. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Kin relationships are composed of many subunits such as motherhood, fatherhood 
grandparenthood, and sibship. Evolutionary approaches suggest that qualitatively 
distinct kin relationships have posed recurrently different adaptive problems to human 
ancestors, resulting in relationship-specific psychological adaptations (Kurland & 
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Gaulin, 2005; Wilson & Daly, 1997). The evolved psychologies of motherhood and 
fatherhood have been actively explored in recent decades (Geary, 2005; Salmon, 2005). 
The study of grandparents, uncles, and aunts has received some attention (Euler & 
Weitzel, 1996; Gaulin, McBurney, & Brakeman-Wartell, 1997; Michalski & 
Shackelford, 2005). Aside from the anthropological investigation of cousin marriages 
(Levi-Strauss, 1969), the psychology of cousin relationships has remained entirely 
unexplored.  
Due to a key feature of mammalian, primate, and human reproductive biology− 
internal female fertilization− paternity probability has proven a key predictor of paternal 
investment. Since women may cuckold their long-term mates through extra-pair 
copulations, males experience reduced paternity. Not all of men’s putative offspring are 
their genetic offspring. Because compromised paternity probability reduces the 
reproductive payoff of a male’s investment, selection should favor reducing investment 
in response to reduced paternity (Houston & Davies, 1985; Trivers, 1972; Winkler, 
1987). In humans, considerable empirical evidence indicates that fathers do invest less 
in parental care as their paternity is reduced (Anderson, Kaplan, & Lancaster, 1999; 
Marlowe, 1999).  
Reduced paternity has also been shown to affect the investment strategies of 
grandparents. Because the vertical links through males are less certain than the links 
through females, the number of uncertain links between distant family members 
theoretically should predict interactions with distant kin. For example, a maternal 
grandmother is connected to her grandchildren through two certain links; a maternal 
grandfather and a paternal grandmother are connected through one certain and one 
uncertain link; and a paternal grandfather is connected through two uncertain links. 
Smith (1988) predicted that maternal grandmothers should invest in their grandchildren 
the most, followed by both maternal grandfathers and paternal grandmothers, with 
paternal grandfathers investing the least. Empirical tests supported the prediction 
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(DeKay, 1995; Euler & Weitzel, 1996; Laham, Gonsalkorale, & von Hippel, 2005; 
Michalski & Shackelford, 2005; Pashos, 2000). Matrilateral aunts and uncles are 
predicted to invest more in nieces and nephews than patrilateral aunts and uncles. The 
laterality and sex-of-investor biases have been documented (Gaulin et al., 1997; 
McBurney, Simon, Gaulin, & Geliebter, 2002). 
Because investment in kin of the next generation constitutes just one form of kin 
altruism, the logic of differential altruism as a function of differential paternity 
uncertainty should extend to investment patterns among cousins. Cousins come in four 
categories based on relationship to the focal individual: mother’s sister’s (MoSis) 
children; mother’s brother’s (MoBro) children; father’s sister’s (FaSis) children; and 
father’s brother’s (FaBro) children. A focal individual can be completely “certain” (no 
conscious awareness implied) that all putative MoSis children are genetically related to 
herself or himself by a coefficient of relatedness of one-eighth. One uncertainty link 
occurs for putative FaSis children and MoBro children. And two uncertainty links occur 
for putative FaBro children (see Figure 5.1) (although there could be another uncertain 
genetic link between the focal individual’s parent and her or his aunts/uncles, such 
uncertainty would be the same across each cousin categories and hence can be ignored 
for the present purposes). I therefore hypothesized that psychological adaptations have 
evolved to regulate cousin-directed altruism in response to the varied levels of paternity 
uncertainty across categories of cousins. I construct a kin selection model of altruism 
toward distinct cousins, showing that hypothesized evolved decision rules will lead one 
to act most altruistically toward one’s MoSis children, followed by both FaSis children 




















Figure 5.1. The genealogical links between self and different categories of cousins. (a) 
A self and its mother’s sister’s (MoSis) children. (b) A self and its 
mother’s brother’s (MoBro) children. (c) A self and its father’s sister’s 
(FaSis) children. (d) A self and its father’s brother’s (FaBro) children. The 
dashed line (---) indicates that within-pair paternity might be reduced due 
to cuckoldry.  
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Based on this formal model of discriminative cousin altruism, this chapter presents 
empirical tests of the model’s key prediction that willingness to act altruistically toward 
cousins will follow the order (1) MoSis children, (2) both MoBro and FaSis children, 
and (3) FaBro children. I conducted a study that explored willingness to help cousins 
using hypothetical dilemmas involving life-and-death situations. Recent research has 
shown that psychological variables such as emotional closeness, empathic concern, and 
the frequency of contact may mediate the effect of genetic relatedness on decisions to 
act altruistically toward kin (Korchmaros & Kenny, 2001, 2006; Neyer & Lang, 2003). I 
predicted that emotional closeness, empathic concern, and frequency of contact would 
also follow the same order across the distinct categories of cousins, affording three 




One hundred ninety-five undergraduate students from the University of Texas at 
Austin (84 women and 111 men) participated in this study. It was made clear in the 
recruiting stage that only those with one or more cousins would be eligible to 
participate. The mean age of participants was 19.8 (± S.D. 1.5) years (range=18–27). 
 
Investment Instrument 
The first section of the instrument requested basic demographic information of 
participants (age, sex, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status (SES)). I explicitly defined 
the four categories of cousins so that participants could clearly distinguish each cousin 
category (e.g., “paternal aunt’s children (=father’s sister’s children)”). Participants were 
asked to consider only their “blood-related” cousins and to ignore any genetically 
unrelated cousins through stepparents or foster parents. For each cousin category, 
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participants were instructed to think of the cousin whose age is closest to their own. 
This restriction was designed to prevent introducing any bias that might occur if 
participants chose their favorite cousin from each type of cousin. The demographic 
information (age, sex, and SES) of each cousin was obtained. The remaining sections of 
the instrument were repeated for each category of cousins; hence, participants who had 
all four categories of cousins answered four times for each question. 
The second section assessed psychological variables hypothesized to mediate the 
association between genetic relatedness and kin-directed altruism: emotional closeness, 
empathic concern, and the frequency of contact. Participants evaluated, using a seven-
point rating scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much), how emotionally close they felt to 
each cousin. Using the same seven-point scale, they also evaluated how much they 
cared for the well-being of each cousin. They further evaluated, on a ten-point rating 
scale from 1 (never) to 10 (every day), how often they communicated with each person 
by email, phone, letter, or in person. 
The third section measured participants’ willingness to act altruistically toward 
cousins in a hypothetical dilemma involving life-or-death situations. Participants read 
the following scenario: 
 
As you make your way through the city you walk past a building that is blazing 
with flames. You instantly realize that the building has been housing a meeting attended 
by your cousin ____________ (fill in the initials). Your cousin ___________ in the 
rapidly burning building badly needs your help, yet entering the burning building to 
save him or her would risk injury to you. 
 
Participants were asked on a seven-point rating scale from 1 (extremely unlikely) 
to 7 (extremely likely): “How likely would you enter the burning building and attempt 
to save your cousin’s life, despite the considerable harm to you?” Information about the 
 92
residential distances between participants and each category of cousins was collected in 
order examine whether residential distance acts as a confounding variable that could 
affect the willingness-to-help scores. The rating scale was based on the logarithmic ten-
point scale developed by Euler and Weitzel (1996). 
Finally, I asked forced-choice questions about emotional closeness, empathic 
concern, and the willingness to help cousins. Participants were asked, for example, 
“Among those different kinds of cousins you actually have, which kind of cousin are 
you emotionally closest to?” Participants having only one category of cousin were 
instructed not to answer. 
 
Data set and Statistical Analysis 
Fifty six participants had all four categories of cousins. Statistical analyses were 
performed for those 56 participants having all four categories of cousins, and for all 
participants (N = 195) having at least one category of cousin. The number of cousin 
categories participants had did not affect the average rating of the willingness-to-help 
(one-way ANOVA, F(3,194) = 1.24, n.s.). Although the willingness-to-help scores and 
other psychological variables were negatively skewed (skewness coefficient = −1.00), 
parametric statistics were used in this study because the F statistic is quite robust to 
moderate violations of the normality assumption (Cohen, 1969). I confirmed that both 




There were no significant main effects or interactions for sex of participant in 
responses on force-choice items or rating-scale items, nor were there any significant 
main effects or interactions for the sex of participants’ cousins. Therefore, the data were 
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collapsed across the two variables (sex of participants, sex of participants’ cousins) in 
subsequent analyses. 
 
Forced-choice life-or-death data 
The 56 participants who had all four categories of cousins were asked which 
cousin they would help the most in a hypothetical life-or-death situation. The overall 
null hypothesis would dictate that each category of cousins would be equally chosen by 
chance alone. The observed distribution of choices was 26:3:14:13 for mother’s sisters’ 
(MoSis) children, mother’s brother’s (MoBro) children, father’s sister’s (FaSis) 
children, and father’s brother’s (FaBro) children, respectively. A chi-square test 
revealed that the observed distribution was significantly different from the distribution 
expected by chance, supporting the first prediction in this study (χ2 = 19.0; df = 3; p 
< .001). Next, I collapsed the MoBro children and FaSis children into a single 
composite and tested the null sub-hypothesis of 1:2 for the MoSis children and the 
composite. A significant difference was also detected (χ2 = 14.24; df = 1; p < .001). 
Lastly, I tested the null hypothesis of 2:1 for the composite variable above and the 
FaBro children. The chi-square test failed to detect a significant difference (χ2 = 1.35; df 
= 1; p= .245). Therefore, the hypothesis that the order of willingness-to-help scores 
would be MoSis > MoBro = FaSis > FaBro was generally supported, except that FaBro 
children would be helped the least (Table 5.1). 
Similar results were obtained for the forced-choice items about emotional 
closeness and empathic concern. For both items, the overall null hypothesis that each 
category of cousins would equally chosen was rejected. Further, the null subhypothesis 
of 1:2 for MoBro children and the composite variable noted above was rejected. The 
null subhypothesis of 2:1 for the composite variable and FaBro children, however, was 
not rejected (Table 5.1).  
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Table 5.1. Forced-choice data of willingness-to-help scores and other psychological 
variables for the subsample having all four cousin categories (n =56). (An 








(MoSis: MoBro: FaSis: FaBro) 26:3:14:13 27:10:8:11 31:6:7:12 
χ2 of overall null hypothesis  
(MoSis: MoBro: FaSis: FaBro = 1:1:1:1) 19.0* 16.43* 29.0* 
χ2 of null hypothesis #1 
(MoSis: MoBro + FaSis = 1:2) 14.24* 6.145* 27.28* 
χ2 of null hypothesis #2 
 (MoBro + FaSis: FaBro = 2:1) 1.35 0.277 2.42 
 
Willingness to act altruistically, emotional closeness, empathic concern, and 
frequency of contact  
Willingness to act altruistically toward cousins 
The prediction was that willingness to act altruistically toward cousins would be 
arranged in the following order: (1) MoSis children, (2) both MoBro and FaSis children, 
and (3) FaBro children. I controlled for the effects of the residential distance between 
participants and each of their cousins and the age difference between the two. Cousins 
who happened to live close to each other would have more opportunities to develop 
cooperative relationships than those living far away, so the residential distance may act 
as a confound. Indeed, for the total sample of participants, repeated measures ANOVA 
revealed that the residential distance between participants and cousins was marginally 
significantly different across the four cousin categories (F(3, 355) = 2.558, p = .055). 
Another potential confound is age, since the age differences between participants and 
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their cousins may affect cousin-directed altruism. For the total sample, the age 
difference between participants and cousins differed significantly across the four cousin 
categories (F(3,355) = 5.952, p = .001). Thus, subsequent analysis included the 
residential distance and the age difference as covariates.  
Repeated measures analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with the two covariates 
was conducted on the willingness-to-help scores for the total sample of participants. 
There was a highly significant main effect of different cousin categories on the 
willingness-to-help scores (F(3,352) = 10.848, p < .001). The mean ratings were 
arranged in the following order: MoSis children, MoBro children, FaSis children, and 
FaBro children (Table 5.2). A significant linear trend was revealed (F(1,352) = 28.489, 
p < .001). The results confirm the first prediction that cousin-directed helping 
tendencies would be arranged in the order of (1) MoSis children, (2) both MoBro and 
FaSis children, and (3) FaBro children. Planned repeated comparisons where adjacent 
group means are compared showed that participants were significantly more willing to 
help their MoSis children than their MoBro children (p = .001), but not significantly 
more willing to help their MoBro children than their FaSis children (p = .616). 
Participants were slightly more willing to help their FaSis children than their FaBro 
children, although this comparison did not reach statistical significance (p = .151). 
Overall, the difference between the adjusted means of FaSis children and FaBro 
children was much greater than the difference between MoBro children and FaSis 









Table 5.2. Raw and (adjusted) mean ratings of willingness-to-help across distinct cousin 
categories, adjusted for age differences and residential distance. 
  
total sample 
(n = 195) 
those having all four cousins 
 (n = 56) category of 
cousins 
Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. 
MoSis children 6.05 (6.12) 1.42 149 5.89 (5.88) 1.23 
MoBro children 5.73 (5.74) 1.46 148 5.59 (5.58) 1.36 
FaSis children 5.59 (5.68) 1.32 126 5.39 (5.42) 1.55 
FaBro children 5.50 (5.51) 1.11 131 5.34 (5.34) 1.67 
 
A similar analysis for the subset of participants having all four categories found 
the same pattern. The effect of the different cousin categories on the willingness-to-help 
scores was significant (repeated measures ANCOVA, F(3,163) = 3.813, p = .011), and a 
significant linear trend was detected (F(1, 163) = 10.60, p = .001). Due to the reduced 
sample size, planned repeated comparisons revealed that only the difference between 
the adjusted ratings of MoSis children and MoBro children was marginally significant 
(p = .084). Given that both samples show the same pattern of ratings, I hereafter focus 

































Figure 5.2. The adjusted mean ratings (and standard error) of willingness-to-help scores 
among four different cousin categories, controlling for age differences and 
residential distance. 
 
Emotional closeness, empathic concern, and the frequency of contact 
The ratings of three possible predictors of cousin-directed altruism were 
significantly correlated with one another (r = .59 for emotional closeness and concern, r 
= .72 for emotional closeness and contact, and r = .45 for concern and contact: all ps 
< .01). These correlations provide circumstantial evidence for the reliability and validity 
of these variables as indices of altruism toward cousins. Indeed, each of the predictors 
was significantly correlated with the willingness-to-help scores (r = .44 for empathic 
concern, r = .42 for emotional closeness, and r = .31 for contact frequency: all ps < .01). 
To test the prediction that the three predictors should also be arranged in the order 
predicted by the formal model, a repeated measures ANCOVA including residential 
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distance and age differences as covariates was conducted on each variable.  Emotional 
closeness ratings were significantly different across distinct cousin categories (F(3,352) 
= 10.961, p < .001), showing a significant linear trend (F(1,352) = 28.13, p < .001) in 
which the adjusted mean ratings were arranged in the same way as willingness-to-help 
ratings (Table 5.3). Planned repeated comparisons found that the difference between 
MoSis children and MoBro children was significant (p = .001). Neither the difference 
between MoBro children and FaSis children nor between FaSis children and FaBro 
children was significant. 
Analyses conducted on empathic concern ratings revealed a significant main effect 
of different cousin categories on empathic concern (repeated measures ANCOVA, 
F(3,352) = 5.548, p = .001), revealing a significant linear trend (F(1,352) = 10.367, p 
= .001). Consistent with the prediction, the adjusted mean ratings were arranged in the 
descending order of (1) MoSis children, (2) FaSis Children, (3) MoBro children, and (4) 
FaBro children.  
The ratings of contact frequency were also significantly different among different 
cousin categories (repeated measures ANCOVA, F(3,352) = 8.492, p < .001) and 
showed a significant linear trend (F(1,352) = 19.99, p = .001). The adjusted mean 
ratings were arranged in the same way as empathic concern. Participants concerned 
about their MoSis children significantly more than their FaSis children (p < .001), not 
significantly concerned their FaSis children than their MoBro children (p = .851), and 
not significantly concerned their MoBro children than their FaBro children (p = .174).  
 
 
Table 5.3. Raw and (adjusted) mean ratings of emotional closeness, empathic concern, and contact frequency across distinct cousin 





concern contact frequency category of  
cousins N Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
MoSis children 149 4.70(4.56) 1.61 5.69(6.04) 1.47 5.25(5.13) 2.35 
MoBro children 148 3.91(3.88) 1.65 6.02(5.58) 1.22 4.33(4.28) 2.24 
FaSis children 126 3.57(3.58) 1.96 5.53(5.61) 1.54 4.16(4.32) 2.17 




The current research investigated the hypothesis, derived from a formal 
mathematical model, that humans have relationship-specific psychological adaptations 
for cousin-directed altruism sensitive to the different levels of paternity uncertainty 
across categories of cousins. Based on the varied paternity probability, the model of 
altruism toward cousins predicted that MoSis children would be the most favored, 
followed by both MoBro and FaSis children, with FaBro children coming out last. 
Participants reported a willingness to act altruistically toward their MoSis children the 
most, followed by their MoBro children, their FaSis children, and lastly their FaBro 
children. These results strongly confirm the central prediction from the model. Moreover, 
the pattern of psychological predictors of kin-directed altruism − emotional closeness, 
empathic concern, and contact frequency − across distinct cousin categories provided 
three additional confirmations of the model’s predictions. 
The present study failed to detect a statistically significant difference between 
ratings of altruism toward FaSis children and toward FaBro children. It is reasonable to 
conclude, however, that FaSis children are the least likely to be helped among all four 
cousin categories, because (1) the mean rating of FaSis children was invariably the lowest 
in the willingness-to-help scores as well as in all three psychological variables affecting 
altruism; (2) the predicted linear trends proved to be highly significant for all four 
dependent measures; and (3) FaSis children were helped more than FaBro children, as 
predicted, although it just missed conventional significance. Given that MoSis children 
were always ranked at the top position with a high statistical significance (p ≤ .001) for 
all dependent measures, it remains to revealed why the degree to which FaBro children 
are the least likely to be helped appears not to be as robust as expected.  
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Previous studies on the effect of paternity uncertainty on kin relationships have 
centered on investment in putative kin of the next generations, notably paternal 
investment, grandparental investment, and the investment of aunts and uncles (Geary, 
2005; Kurland & Gaulin, 2005). To my knowledge, the present research is the first study 
to show that differential altruism toward kin of the same generation also can be predicted 
by varying levels of paternity probability. Whereas people apparently have the intuitive 
notion that reduced paternity results in reduced investment into the next-generation kin 
(e.g., as reflected in the folk saying “Mama’s baby, Papa’s maybe”) (Buss, 2000), it 
remains to be clarified at the proximate level the precise mechanisms by which altruism 
toward different cousins is affected by variable levels of paternity uncertainty in the 
parental generation.  
One hypothesis is that altruistic tendencies toward their cousins will be largely 
determined by the quality of adult sibling relationship linking two families in the parental 
generation (J. Woolley, 2006, personal communication). Contact and affection between 
siblings in adulthood appears to be greater in sister-sister pairs than in mixed-sex pairs, 
with brother-brother pairs having the least contact and affection (White & Riedmann, 
1992). Thus, an individual may be willing to help the MoSis children the most because 
mothers have kept on good terms with each other as sister-sister dyads. The hypothesis is 
consistent with the previous findings (1) that matrilateral aunts and uncles invest more in 
their nephews and nieces than patrilateral aunts and uncles, and (2) that aunts invest more 
than uncles regardless of laterality (Gaulin et al., 1997; McBurney et al., 2002). Indeed, 
the sister-sister adult dyads are most likely to invest in each other’s children (i.e., in their 
nephews and nieces) due to the absence of reduced maternity from each sister’s 
viewpoint, thus maintaining more cooperative relationships than other types of adult 
sibling dyads. This could represent one proximate path through which the predicted 
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discriminative altruism toward cousins occurs. In short, evolved decision rules for 
cousin-directed altruism may have been designed to convert important environmental 
inputs, such as the quality of sibling relationships in the parental generation, into the 
cognitive or behavioral outputs for discriminative altruism toward cousins. 
Other environmental inputs processed by psychological adaptations for cousin-
directed altruism may include the age differences between cousins and the amount of 
contact early in life resulting from residential distance (the two variables that were treated 
as covariates in this study). The age differences and residential distance may reflect sex 
differences in age at marriage and dispersal, respectively (Euler & Weitzel, 1996; Gaulin 
et al., 1997). Because men on average marry later in life than women do, it follows that 
1) FaSis children will be older on average than one’s own siblings; 2) MoBro children 
will be younger on average than one’s own siblings; and 3) FaBro and MoSis children 
will be the same age on average. The mean age differences across distinct cousin 
categories in the current study were (-1.34):(+1.18):(-1.87):(+0.37) for FaBro children: 
FaSis children: MoBro children: MoSis children, respectively, which roughly coincides 
with my inference. Because individuals should be more willing to help their cousins 
younger than themselves and less willing to help cousins older than themselves, altruism 
toward MoBro children may be augmented and altruism toward FaSis children reduced 
due to the age differences between a focal individual and each category of his or her 
cousins.  
The current research is based on the assumption that the information gained from 
self-reports reliably reflects the actual altruistic behavior toward kin. Previous studies of 
kin investment have shown that it does correspond well to the actual altruistic behavior. 
Sears, Mace, and McGregor (2000) found that Gambian children with a living maternal 
grandmother have better chances of survival than other children (Kurland & Gaulin, 
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2005). Further, there exist no known methodological biases that would have caused the 
participants to report their altruistic tendencies, emotional closeness, empathic concern, 
and contact frequency in ways that all correspond precisely with the a priori theoretical 
predictions. 
In conclusion, the current results support the hypothesis that humans have evolved 
psychological adaptations regulating discriminative altruism toward cousins that are 
sensitive to varying numbers of paternity uncertainty links that characterize the distinct 
cousin categories. The current research is important because it shows that the laterality 
bias resulting from paternity uncertainty exists not only in investment in kin of the next 
generations, as others have demonstrated, but also in kin altruism toward the same 
generation, which this study is the first to demonstrate. The current study reveals an 
important theoretically-predicted design feature of cousin relationships, and consequently 
contributes to a growing body of literature of kinship adaptations. 
 
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA 
5.1. The Model of Cousin Altruism 
I explore how a focal individual’s altruistic effort toward each category of cousins 
is related to the varied levels of paternity in the parental generation, based on Houston’s 
(1995) framework of optimal paternal effort. Let x be the level of effort a focal individual 
invest in an altruistic act toward a certain recipient (who is the actor’s cousin). I assume 
that 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. I denote F(x) as the recipient’s reproductive success due to the altruistic act 
and G(x) as the reproductive success of the actor from investing into cousins other than 
the recipient or not investing at all. Clearly, F(x) will be an increasing function of x and 
G(x) will be a decreasing function of x. The focal actor’s inclusive fitness W by investing 
into a certain putative cousin can be written as follows: 
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)( xGxFxW += ρ ,                   (5A. 1) 
where the recipient’s fitness change is weighted by the genetic relatedness between 
cousins, ⅛, and ρ is the probability that the recipient is the actor’s genetically related 
cousin. Note that, if the focal actor were to have only one category of cousins, G(x) could 
be written as ρG0(x). In that case, it is clear that the optimal effort x* into a putative 
cousin does not depend on ρ. Since it is impossible that our ancestors have had only one 
category of cousins throughout evolutionary history, this possibility can be safely 
ignored.  
A necessary condition for the optimal effort x* is found by differentiating equation 
(5A.1) with respect to x:  
                       0)()(
8
=′+′ ** xGxFρ ,                     (5A.2) 
where prime denotes differentiation with respect to x. The following second-order 
condition should also be satisfied in order for W(x) to have a maximum at x*: 
                       0)()(
8
<′′+′′ ** xGxFρ                     (5A.3) 
Differentiating implicitly equation (5A. 2) with respect to ρ, one can figure out how x* 
changes with ρ: 













.                    (5A.4) 
Reflecting equation (5A.3), it is obvious that the optimal effort x* is positively 
related to ρ, the probability that one’s putative cousin is indeed one’s genetically related 
cousin. Denoting P as the population-average within-pair paternity, one can see that ρs 
for MoSis children, MoBro children, FaSis children, and FaBro children are 1: P: P: P2, 
respectively (see Fig. 5.1). Since reduced ρ results in reduced optimal effort x* into 
altruism toward cousins, the optimal efforts x* toward distinct cousin categories are 
x*MoSis > x*MoBro = x*FaSis > x*FaBro.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Given that Hamilton’s (1964) inclusive fitness theory provides an organizing 
theoretical framework for family relationships, why is it that evolutionary psychologists 
often have difficulty in making concrete predictions about kinship psychology? For 
instance, Daly and Wilson (1995) stressed that parents should favor offspring who are 
likely to yield a higher reproductive return on their parents’ investment. Regarding birth 
order, then, which offspring should be favored by parents? As another example, does 
Hamilton’s (1964) rule dictate that each child will necessarily want more resources for 
itself than its brothers and sisters, due to the logic of genetic relatedness?     
These important questions about family dynamics could be answered by formally 
taking into account the role of reproductive value, Fisher’s (1930) measure that makes it 
possible to compare the reproductive success of various individuals who may be in 
different states (e.g., age). This dissertation attempted 1) to construct evolutionary models 
of familial interactions based on reproductive value approach and 2) to characterize the 
design features of evolved kinship psychological mechanisms by empirically testing a 
priori predictions. In achieving these goals, a number of interesting results were gained. 
In this final chapter I briefly summarize my theoretical and empirical findings and 
suggest future areas of research.  
 
OVERVIEW OF THE FINDINGS  
Chapter 2 examined how parents are expected to allocate their parental investment 
among offspring of differing ages. Verbal reasoning of parental favoritism among 
offspring seemed almost impossible, because older offspring may be favored in terms of 
their higher reproductive value and yet younger offspring may be favored in terms of 
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their higher marginal return from additional resources. It was found that a parent’s 
optimal strategy is to allocate his or her resources such that the marginal benefit to each 
offspring’s survival, weighted by their survival probabilities to the reproductive age, 
should be equal to the marginal cost to the parent’s residual survival. In nearly all 
circumstances, the parental optimum strategy will be realized as biasing parental 
resources toward older offspring.  
The formal model developed in chapter 2 made different predictions from previous 
evolutionary hypotheses of human parental favoritism. Chapter 3 conducted an empirical 
study to evaluate these hypotheses, by asking human parents to hypothetically allocate 
tangible resources like food and money. Participants allocated more resources to the older 
children than the younger children, confirming the predictions obtained from chapter 2. A 
tentative scheme for the functional organization of psychological adaptations for 
allocating parental resources among different children was suggested.  
Chapter 4 theoretically explored how each offspring will be selected to divide 
parental resources among itself and its siblings so as to maximize its own inclusive 
fitness. With the previous insights into the optimal allocation from the viewpoint of 
parents, chapter 4 also investigated how evolutionary conflicts of interests between 
family members of differing ages would take place. The model produced a number of 
interesting predictions on conflicts within the family. For example, it was predicted that a 
junior sibling may want less investment into itself than its senior sibling provided that the 
age spacing is sufficiently wide. Therefore, under wide age spacing between two siblings, 
sibling competition will revolve around how strongly the senior sibling should be 
favored, but not who should be favored.  
Shifting the focus from close kin to distant kin such as cousins, chapter 5 tried to 
elucidate relationship-specific psychological adaptations specifically designed to regulate 
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discriminative altruism toward cousins. The empirical results showed that the laterality 
bias resulting from paternity uncertainty does exist not only in kin investment into the 
next generations, but also in kin altruism toward the same generation.  
 
AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH  
There are several areas that I plan to investigate based on the theoretical and 
empirical results obtained from this dissertation. First, future research should address 
how offspring qualities other than age (e.g., offspring sex or physical condition) would 
influence parental decision rules to divide limited resources among offspring. In other 
words, the architecture of parental psychological mechanisms for allocating resources 
among children should be documented at a comprehensive level. The problem of sex 
allocation, that is, how parents should divide resources between male and female 
offspring, has been extensively studied by evolutionary biologists (Charnov, 1982; 
Fisher, 1930; Frank, 1998; Hardy, 2002). Yet how parental resource allocation would be 
influenced by both offspring sex and age remains to be explored.  
Second, chapter 4’s predictions on sibling competition over parental resources 
should be empirically tested with human children. Some predictions that could be readily 
tested include: 1) as the age spacing increases, the senior sibling will want 
disproportionately more resources for itself than in its younger sibling and 2) as the age 
spacing increases, the junior sibling will want disproportionately less resources for itself 
than in its senior sibling. The predictions may be tested by asking children how they 
would like to allocate hypothetical or real resources among them and their counterpart 
siblings.   
Third, the functional organization of cousin-directed altruism modules should be 
clearly identified. It is not easy to answer how differential altruistic tendencies toward 
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distinct categories of cousins are regulated by variable levels of paternity uncertainty in 
the parental generation. Chapter 5 suggested the quality of parental sibling relationship as 
an important environmental input that is processed by cousin-directed altruism 
mechanisms. More research is necessary, however, to fill in the gaps in our knowledge of 
how cousin-specific psychological adaptations develops and reliably operates throughout 
lifetime.   
As a concluding remark, the studies presented here demonstrate that the 
evolutionary perspective has a great potential to revolutionize the study of human kinship 
in the near future. All too often, evolutionary perspective applied to human kinship is 
mistaken as something that exclusively focuses on the effect of genetic relatedness on 
family relationships. The theoretical framework provided here reveals that a wide variety 
of intrafamilial conflict is expected to take place even when all family members are 
identically related to each other by 0.5. Supplying a number of testable predictions about 
familial interactions and reporting noble empirical results on human kinship, the studies 
presented here could open a fruitful avenue for inferring the adaptive design of evolved 
psychological mechanisms for human kinship.  
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